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I. INTRODUCTION 
Italian Colors Restaurant, a small merchant in California, decided to 
contract with American Express to accommodate wealthy consumers and 
corporate clients who use the American Express personal and corporate 
charge cards.1  Under the provisions of the American Express agreement, 
Italian Colors was also forced to accept American Express’s general-
purpose credit card, which does not attract a similarly affluent and 
profitable clientele.2  But for American Express’s “Honor All Cards” 
policy, most merchants would not accept the general-purpose credit card 
because it does not bring in enough profit to justify the higher fees that 
come with it.3  Nevertheless, American Express charged the same merchant 
discount fee on both the charge and credit cards, which is about thirty-five 
percent higher than its competitors at Visa and MasterCard.4  Thus, not 
only did Italian Colors have to accept a credit card it would not otherwise, 
it lost an additional seventy cents on every such purchase.5  American 
                                                          
 1. See Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 1, 3, 24-25, In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 
No. 03-cv-09592-GBD (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2009) (noting that American Express issues 
corporate charge cards to 70% of Fortune 500 companies). 
 2. See id. at ¶¶ 2, 33 (explaining that all merchants contracting with American 
Express were required to accept any card bearing the American Express name, 
trademark, logo, or service mark). 
 3. See id. at ¶¶ 19, 36 (noting that the general-purpose credit card, unlike the 
charge card, does not require cardholders to pay off their full balance at the end of 
every month). 
 4. See id. at ¶¶ 22, 36 (noting that American Express charges a merchant discount 
fee of 2.7% for all of its cards, whereas Visa and MasterCard each impose a 2.0% 
merchant discount fee). 
 5. See id. at ¶ 17 (claiming the merchants were damaged by having to accept the 
credit cards that could impose a higher fee than would prevail absent the tying 
arrangement). 
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Express’s policy of conditioning the availability of the corporate charge 
card on the merchants’ agreement to also accept their general-purpose 
credit card is considered a “tying” arrangement, which may be per se 
illegal under the federal antitrust laws.6 
Italian Colors filed suit and sought to certify a class of similarly 
aggrieved merchants.7  Unfortunately for Italian Colors, the merchant 
agreement they signed with American Express included an arbitration 
clause prohibiting merchants from participating as a class or acting in a 
representative capacity.8  According to an expert economist, Italian Colors 
and similar small merchants could only hope to receive less than six 
thousand dollars in trebled damages for a claim that could cost one million 
dollars in expert fees.9  Italian Colors was then at a crossroads because it 
did not have the resources to pay for arbitration, and it could not spread the 
costs amongst those merchants who could also bring a claim.10  As a result, 
no merchant could feasibly pursue arbitration and American Express did 
not have to face consequences for illegal activity.11 
Italian Colors and its fellow merchants successfully raised this argument 
in the Second Circuit, which held that a class action waiver that makes 
individual arbitration prohibitively expensive is unenforceable as a de facto 
waiver of liability for American Express if the merchants have no suitable 
forum through which they can vindicate their rights.12  American Express 
                                                          
 6. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 2, 10 (1984) 
(acknowledging a per se illegal tying arrangement exists when a seller possessing 
sufficient market power for the tying product exploits its control to force buyers to 
purchase a separate product the buyer either did not want or would have purchased 
elsewhere on different terms). 
 7. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig. (Italian Colors III), 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d 
Cir.) (describing the purported class as all merchants who accepted American Express 
credit cards as a result of accepting American Express charge cards), reh’g en banc 
denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 8. See id. at 209 (outlining the dispute resolution clause under which merchants 
may only bring a claim individually in arbitration or small claims court). 
 9. See id. at 218 (citing an economic study stating that the plaintiffs’ costs could 
exceed one million dollars, where the average merchant could expect $5252 or less in 
trebled damages). 
 10. See id. (citing an economist’s opinion that it would be economically irrational 
for an individual merchant to arbitrate). 
 11. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing that when a plaintiff’s expected damages are infinitesimal compared to 
potential costs and no claims can be aggregated, no plaintiff will bring a claim); see 
also Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 209-11 (noting the merchants in this action cannot 
afford to arbitrate unless they can proceed as a class). 
 12. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 204 (concluding that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable because the plaintiffs could not proceed in arbitration 
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challenged the Second Circuit’s holding, posing the question to the 
Supreme Court of “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act permits courts, 
invoking the ‘federal substantive law of arbitrability’ to invalidate 
arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not permit class 
arbitration of a federal statutory claim.”13 Based in part on the Court’s 
recent decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,14 the Supreme Court 
held that the merchants did not present a legitimate “vindication of rights” 
claim and that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) required the Court to 
enforce the arbitration agreement.15 
This Comment argues that an arbitration agreement in an adhesion 
contract that precludes class arbitration and makes individual arbitration 
prohibitively expensive is unenforceable under the FAA because it 
effectively prevents plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory 
rights.16  This Comment also argues that Italian Colors is distinguishable 
from Concepcion because the merchants demonstrated arbitration was 
prohibitively expensive, and because the FAA should not be construed to 
override the substantive rights afforded by other federal statutes.17 
Part II examines how courts interpret the savings clause of the FAA to 
hold arbitration agreements unenforceable, specifically when arbitration in 
a particular plaintiff’s case does not provide an adequate forum for the 
vindication of federal statutory rights.18  Part II also discusses Concepcion 
and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Italian Colors, rejecting the 
vindication of rights doctrine as to the merchants’ claim that American 
Express’s arbitration agreement was unenforceable.19 
                                                          
without incurring prohibitive costs). 
     13.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Am. Express Co., 2012 WL 3091064 (No. 
12-133). 
     14.  131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (holding a California law barring many class 
action waivers was preempted by the FAA for allegedly disfavoring arbitration). 
     15.  See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-
12 (2013) (holding that there was no congressional command to invalidate the 
arbitration agreement and that the Court’s precedents did not require invalidating an 
arbitration agreement where the plaintiffs merely could not afford to prove their claim). 
 16. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 219 (holding an arbitration agreement 
containing a class action waiver unenforceable because allowing the plaintiffs to 
aggregate their claims was the only economically rational way to vindicate their 
statutory rights). 
 17. See id. at 213 (holding that Concepcion did not control the question presented 
because substantive rights under federal law were at stake, as opposed to state contract 
law). 
 18. See infra Part II (outlining how the FAA has been interpreted by the courts, and 
how the Supreme Court established the vindication of rights doctrine applied in Italian 
Colors III). 
 19. See infra Part II (explaining how the Supreme Court rejected the Second 
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Part III argues that the Supreme Court should have held that the 
vindication of rights doctrine falls squarely under the FAA, and that the 
Second Circuit properly held American Express’s arbitration agreement 
unenforceable vis-à-vis Italian Colors.20 Part III also asserts that 
Concepcion is distinguishable as addressing purely state law, and argues 
that Supreme Court precedent establishes that a plaintiff may assert a 
prohibitive costs defense regardless of the form of those prohibitive costs.21  
Part IV offers policy arguments for ratifying the vindication of rights 
doctrine in order to preserve the viability of small-dollar claims.22  Finally, 
Part V concludes that had the Court invalidated the kinds of arbitration 
agreements crafted by American Express, future courts could have ensured 
that the FAA is reconciled with other federal statutes and make arbitration 
agreements as enforceable as other contracts.23 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal Arbitration Act, Preemption, and Federal Harmonization  
The FAA, enacted in 1925, was intended to reverse judicial hostility to 
the arbitral forum and ensure arbitration agreements are as enforceable as 
any other contract.24  Thus, Congress established a mandate to enforce 
arbitration agreements according to their terms and resolve doubts as to the 
breadth of an agreement in favor of arbitration.25  Contract disputes are 
generally arbitrable, unless the contested issue relates to the making and 
performance of the arbitration clause itself.26 
                                                          
Circuit’s attempt to distinguish the Court’s recent opinion in Concepcion).  
 20. See infra Part III (arguing that even if an arbitration agreement must be upheld 
in cases that may affect the vindication of state-law rights, the FAA should not be 
extended to prevent the vindication of federal statutory rights). 
 21. See infra Part III (concluding that the holding in Concepcion should be limited 
to questions of state law but that its comparison of bilateral and class arbitration should 
be applied to the question of prohibitive costs). 
 22. See infra Part IV (discussing the importance of the class action mechanism in 
small-dollar claims). 
 23. See infra Part V (concluding that the vindication of rights doctrine is necessary 
to ensure plaintiffs who would incur prohibitive costs can still pursue a claim). 
 24. See generally 9 U.S.C. § 2 et seq. (2006); Vaden v. Discover Bank, 129 S. Ct. 
1262, 1274 (2009) (describing the “ouster” doctrine, under which courts refrained from 
ordering parties to submit their claims to arbitration despite an arbitration agreement 
because those clauses ‘ousted’ the courts of their jurisdiction). 
 25. See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983) (finding a congressional declaration of a liberal policy favoring arbitration and 
that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a “healthy regard” for 
arbitration). 
 26. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp., 388 U.S. 395, 404 
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Since enactment of the FAA, courts have upheld arbitration agreements 
so long as the agreement does not violate general principles of state 
contract law or directly undermine the substantive federal statutory rights at 
issue.27  Section Two of the FAA, known as the Act’s savings clause, 
provides that any contract agreeing to settle disputes in arbitration is “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”28  Courts can invalidate 
arbitration agreements under state contract law for the same defenses that 
would render any contract unenforceable, such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability, so long as the defenses proffered do not arise 
specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.29 
When a state law is in direct conflict with a federal law or impedes a 
federal objective, the federal law may preempt the state law.30  When two 
federal laws are in conflict, however, preemption is not a concern; instead, 
courts must make an effort to balance the interests of both federal statutes 
and give weight to each.31  When one statute is more recent than the other, 
courts must give effect to the latest statute while allowing the earlier 
legislative expression to continue to operate.32  Courts should not assume 
                                                          
(1967) (holding that an arbitrator could resolve a claim of “fraud in the inducement” 
because the fraud related to the contract generally, rather than the making of the 
arbitration agreement); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984) 
(holding the Act was applicable in state court because the legislative history suggested 
Congress did not intend to confine arbitrations to only those seeking enforcement in 
federal court). 
 27. See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, 317 F.3d 646, 663 (6th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) (holding an arbitration agreement containing cost-splitting and remedy-limitation 
provisions unenforceable for undermining the deterrent and remedial purposes of Title 
VII). 
 28. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); see also Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 
687 (1996) (recognizing that the FAA savings clause permits courts to invalidate 
arbitration agreements for contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or 
unconscionability). 
 29. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492, 493 n.9 (1987) (limiting 
unconscionability as a defense when the theory is derived from the uniqueness of 
arbitration). 
 30. See, e.g., Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (noting 
further that state law can be preempted when Congress evinced an intention to occupy 
the field). 
 31. See Pennsylvania v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 723 F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (noting that “statutory provisions enacted at different times [are] read as 
harmoniously as possible”). 
 32. See Int’l Union of Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 289 
F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (concluding that when successive enactments are 
inconsistent, a court must resolve the ambiguity to give effect to the latest statute and 
still allow the earlier statute to be operative). 
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that legislators intended to render an earlier statute in the United States 
Code superfluous when interpreting two conflicting federal statutes.33 
B. Supreme Court Precedent Establishing the Vindication of Rights 
Doctrine 
Federal statutory claims are arbitrable so long as Congress did not 
indicate a desire to foreclose arbitration of the particular statutory right at 
issue, including claims under the antitrust laws.34  If the agreement to 
arbitrate requires potential litigants to forgo federal substantive rights, 
however, the agreement is unenforceable because the plaintiffs cannot 
effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration.35 
In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court considered whether to adopt a 
categorical rule to bar antitrust claims from arbitration.36  The Court 
declined to adopt such a rule because Congress did not explicitly intend to 
preclude antitrust claims from arbitration and there was no inherent conflict 
between the two.37  Moreover, the plaintiffs did not contest that the statute 
could not function as Congress intended in arbitration or that they would 
have to forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute.38  The Court 
held, however, that an arbitration agreement is only enforceable “so long as 
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of 
action in the arbitral forum.”39  Indeed, as long as arbitration merely 
provides a change in forum but does not affect any substantive rights in the 
underlying statutory scheme, an arbitration agreement does not run afoul of 
                                                          
 33. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (finding that an 
interpretation of one statute which would render enforcement of the earlier statute 
impracticable was impermissible). 
 34. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
636-37 (1975) (holding that antitrust claims were arbitrable because there was no 
congressional indication in the text or legislative history of the Sherman Act that the 
statute protected against waiver of the right to a judicial forum). 
 35. See id. at 637 n.19 (acknowledging the Court would readily condemn an 
agreement that effectively operated as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies). 
 36. See id. at 623-25 (rejecting the premise that an arbitration agreement could not 
protect the viability of federal statutory claims that would typically protect the non-
drafter without an agreement to arbitrate those particular statutory claims). 
 37. See id. at 633-34 (reasoning that the complexity of antitrust claims alone was 
insufficient to rule as a matter of law that antitrust claims were inherently inconsistent 
with arbitration). 
 38. See id. at 637 (indicating that the antitrust laws would continue to serve both 
their remedial and deterrent functions so long as the plaintiffs could effectively 
vindicate their rights). 
     39.  See id. (declining to speculate as to whether the particular agreement at issue in 
fact had such an effect on the claimant’s federal statutory rights). 
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this principle.40  Since Mitsubishi Motors, the Court has found that 
arbitration is not inherently inconsistent with the federal statutes often 
applicable to contracts containing arbitration agreements, such as the 
Securities Exchange Act and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.41 
In addition to the requirement that a plaintiff must get the full benefit of 
the substantive rights provided for in the statute, plaintiffs may not be 
subjected to arbitration if they could not bring a claim without incurring 
prohibitive costs.42  In Green Tree, a financial institution compelled a 
mobile home purchaser to arbitrate her claims under the Truth in Lending 
Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.43  The plaintiff alleged that 
Green Tree’s agreement, which was silent as to arbitration expenses, posed 
the risk that arbitration would be financially inaccessible.44  
Acknowledging that possibility, the Court held a plaintiff alleging that 
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive bears the burden of proving 
the likelihood of incurring such costs.45  In sum, Green Tree adds to the 
“effective vindication” equation the requirement that a plaintiff should not 
incur prohibitive costs.46  
The combination of the tests arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green 
                                                          
 40. See id. at 628 (finding that a party only agrees to a change in forum by 
assenting to an arbitration agreement, and does not agree to forgo any substantive 
rights). 
 41. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991) 
(holding that claims under the ADEA were arbitrable because the arbitrators had the 
power to grant the same remedies and equitable relief that a plaintiff could receive in 
court); see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 230 (1987) 
(concluding that absent obvious legislative intent and any apparent conflict, plaintiffs’ 
statutory claims were arbitrable because they could realize the same remedies in 
arbitration and litigation). 
 42. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) 
(recognizing that large arbitration costs may preclude a litigant with limited financial 
means from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights); see also Italian Colors 
III, 667 F.3d 204, 212 (2d Cir.) (noting that prohibitive costs exist when the cost of 
pursuing arbitration would dwarf any potential recovery), reh’g en banc denied, 681 
F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 
S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 43. See 531 U.S. at 79 (claiming petitioners violated the Truth in Lending Act by 
failing to disclose an insurance requirement and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act by 
requiring her to arbitrate her statutory claims). 
 44. See id. (positing that an agreement silent as to arbitration costs created a risk 
she would bear prohibitive costs). 
 45. See id. at 90-92 (finding the arbitration agreement was enforceable because the 
plaintiff did not develop any evidentiary record attesting to the likelihood she would 
incur prohibitive costs). 
 46. See id. at 90 (indicating that prohibitive costs is a relevant inquiry in 
determining whether a plaintiff can effectively vindicate her federal statutory rights). 
9
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Tree is the vindication of rights doctrine, which states that an arbitration 
agreement is enforceable so long as a plaintiff can effectively vindicate her 
rights in arbitration.47  A plaintiff can effectively vindicate her rights when 
the substantive rights under the statute are still in place and prohibitive 
costs will not preclude the plaintiff from bringing a claim in arbitration.48 
The Supreme Court has tended to disfavor class actions in the arbitration 
context because it changes the nature of arbitration and arguably 
compromises some of its benefits.49  In Stolt-Nielsen, the Court determined 
that an arbitrator could not permit a group of plaintiffs to proceed as a class 
unless there was a contractual basis for concluding that the parties agreed 
to do so.50  If the arbitration agreement is silent as to whether it permits 
class arbitration, courts now must assume the lack of consent is an implicit 
prohibition on collective proceedings.51  The holding in Stolt-Nielsen that 
class arbitration is only permitted when it is expressly provided for is a 
foreshadowing of the Court’s ultimate determination in AT&T Mobility 
LLC v. Concepcion that aggregated proceedings are inconsistent with 
arbitration.52 
C. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
The Supreme Court held in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion that the 
FAA preempted a state law prohibiting class action waivers in small-dollar 
claims because class arbitration interferes with the benefits of arbitration.  
The Concepcions filed a class action against AT&T for false advertising 
                                                          
 47. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 216 (holding that Mitsubishi Motors and 
Green Tree require courts to find arbitration agreements unenforceable when the 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that arbitration is so prohibitively expensive that they cannot 
vindicate their rights). 
 48. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding that prohibitive costs for the plaintiff 
could provide grounds for finding an arbitration agreement unenforceable); Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636-37 (1975) (finding 
that a plaintiff cannot effectively vindicate her rights in arbitration if the substantive 
rights afforded by the applicable federal statute are compromised). 
 49. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1759, 1775-76 
(2010) (opining that bilateral arbitration is fundamentally different from class 
arbitration in its informality, simplicity, and expediency). 
 50. See id. at 1775 (holding that a party may not be compelled to submit to class 
arbitration absent clear assent to do so because it changes the nature of the agreement 
to such a degree that an arbitrator cannot assume the parties consented to it). 
 51. See id. (holding that even though an arbitrator may presume parties implicitly 
authorized some procedures, an implicit agreement to authorize class arbitration is no 
such procedure because of the differences between class and bilateral arbitration). 
 52. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750 (2011) (noting 
that Stolt-Nielsen portrayed the character of class arbitration as ‘fundamentally’ 
different from bilateral arbitration (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1776)). 
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and fraud under California’s Discover Bank rule, which states that class 
action waivers are unenforceable in adhesion contracts when small 
damages are at stake and the drafter attempts to cheat large numbers of 
consumers out of individually small amounts of money.53  Pursuant to their 
wireless service agreement containing an arbitration clause and a class 
action waiver, AT&T moved to compel arbitration.54  The district court and 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prohibition of class actions was 
unconscionable, despite finding the agreement was largely consumer 
friendly and would likely make the plaintiffs whole, even in bilateral 
arbitration.55  Notably, the Ninth Circuit determined that the FAA did not 
preempt, and was consistent with, the Discover Bank rule, considering the 
rule an unconscionability principle that applied to contracts generally and 
placed arbitration agreements on equal footing.56 
Although the Discover Bank rule nominally applied to all contracts, the 
Supreme Court found that the state law rule would have a disproportionate 
impact on arbitration agreements, thereby interfering with Congress’s 
objective in enacting the FAA.57  This disproportionate impact arises out of 
the Court’s perception that class action waivers affect agreements to 
arbitrate more often than other contracts, likening the waivers to a waiver 
of judicially monitored discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence.58  
According to the Court, requiring the availability of class wide arbitration 
interferes with the “fundamental attributes” of arbitration—its simplicity 
and expediency—by involving more procedures and slowing down the 
process.59  Because class arbitration enlarges the potential number of 
                                                          
 53. See id. at 1744 (believing AT&T engaged in false advertising and fraud by 
charging sales tax on a cell phone advertised as free). 
 54. See id. (citing the arbitration clause which mandated plaintiffs to bring claims 
individually, not as a class member, in any purported class or representative 
proceeding). 
 55. See id. at 1744-6 (agreeing with the Concepcions that because the provision 
was unconscionable under Discover Bank, finding the arbitration agreement 
unenforceable fell under the FAA savings clause). 
 56. See id. at 1745-47 (finding a waiver of class actions in litigation 
unconscionable under Discover Bank). 
 57. See id. at 1747-48 (finding the overarching purpose of the FAA was to facilitate 
streamlined proceedings, and that class arbitrations do not comport with this purpose). 
 58. See id. at 1748, 1750 (concluding that most consumer contracts in today’s 
world are contracts of adhesion containing class action waivers).  But see Brief for 
Respondent at 32-33, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893) (distinguishing 
waivers to discovery or the Federal Rules of Evidence from class action waivers 
because the former are inherently associated with litigation while the latter is 
compatible with both litigation and arbitration). 
 59. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51 (opining that class arbitration slows 
down the proceeding because additional procedures accompany the consideration of 
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plaintiffs, and thus the amount of potential damages, businesses may have 
less incentive to resort to arbitration, especially where a court would only 
overturn a judgment upon a showing of corruption or partiality by the 
arbitrator.60  Moreover, requiring the availability of class arbitration 
generally says nothing about the particular plaintiffs’ ability to arbitrate 
bilaterally.61  Pursuant to AT&T’s agreement that provided enough 
consumer-friendly provisions to incentivize plaintiffs to proceed 
individually, the Concepcions did not need to aggregate their claims to be 
made whole.62  Because of AT&T’s contract provisions requiring a seven 
thousand five hundred dollar premium and double attorney’s fees, the 
Concepcions were essentially guaranteed at least a full recovery.63  The 
Court repeatedly noted the Concepcions could have received even excess 
compensation in bilateral arbitration because of the provisions in AT&T’s 
arbitration agreement.64  Therefore, class arbitration was not only 
inconsistent with arbitration’s fundamental attributes but was also 
unnecessary in the case at bar.65  Notably, the Court recognized that a class 
action waiver could keep “small-dollar” claimants from seeking to resolve 
their disputes, but that possibility did not disturb its holding.66 Because a 
rule requiring the availability of class proceedings in certain scenarios may 
make arbitration less attractive, the FAA preempted the Discover Bank 
                                                          
absent parties). 
 60. See id. at 1750-52 (suggesting that because class arbitration poses higher 
transaction costs to defendants who will be less likely to resort to the arbitral forum, the 
Discover Bank rule has the effect of displacing arbitration agreements). 
 61. See id. at 1753 (rejecting the dissent’s contention that class proceedings would 
be necessary to protect small-dollar claims because the Concepcions’ claim was likely 
to be resolved). 
 62. See id. (providing further that AT&T was responsible for the costs of all 
meritorious claims, the customer must arbitrate close to home, and for some claims, the 
customer could opt for arbitration over the phone or purely by papers). 
 63. See id. at 1753 (indicating that plaintiffs with meritorious claims would have an 
incentive to bring their small-dollar claims because they would actually realize a 
sufficient recovery). 
 64. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-32, Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 
09-893) (opining that the Court should only be concerned with the instant parties and 
not the arbitration agreement’s effect on third parties); see also Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
at 1753 (finding the arbitration agreement at issue cognizable under the savings clause 
of the FAA because the Concepcions did not need to proceed as a class in order to 
resolve their claim with AT&T). 
 65. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (indicating that the class action mechanism 
cannot to be preserved in any instance that interferes with the FAA’s objectives). 
 66. See id. (considering the possibility that small-dollar claims could fall through 
the cracks in our legal system “desirable for unrelated reasons”). 
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rule.67 
D. Italian Colors 
1. The Second Circuit Held That the Vindication of Rights Doctrine 
Warranted Invalidating the Arbitration Agreement. 
 The Second Circuit in Italian Colors held that the arbitration agreement 
between American Express and the plaintiff merchants was unenforceable, 
despite the holding in Concepcion, because arbitration was so cost-
prohibitive that plaintiffs could not vindicate their federal statutory rights.68  
Under the provisions of the arbitration agreement, each merchant that 
wanted to bring a claim would have to pay all of the costs of arbitration on 
her own, including expert and attorney’s fees.69  According to an expert 
economist, Italian Colors would likely incur hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in expert fees to prove its antitrust claims, and receive less than six 
thousand dollars in damages.70  Relying on the expert economist’s study, 
plaintiff merchants claimed that enforcing the class action waiver, in 
addition to the agreement’s prohibition on cost sharing or cost shifting, 
would preclude them from vindicating their rights because bilateral 
arbitration would be prohibitively expensive.71 
The Second Circuit held that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable and that Concepcion did not directly apply to the question 
presented.72  Applying the vindication of rights doctrine, the Second Circuit 
held that if a plaintiff could not feasibly pursue a claim individually and 
                                                          
 67. See id. at 1751-52 (claiming that arbitration is poorly suited to the higher stakes 
of class litigation and doubting that Congress intended to allow an arbitrator to handle 
those kinds of claims). 
 68. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir.) (holding that Concepcion did 
not require the Second Circuit to uphold an arbitration agreement if the plaintiffs could 
demonstrate that they could not feasibly vindicate their federal statutory rights), reh’g 
en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 69. See id. at 209-11 (finding in the arbitration clause a provision that prohibits 
merchants from acting in any sort of representative capacity or spreading out fees 
amongst other plaintiffs). 
 70. See id. at 218 (citing an economic study finding the costs of the plaintiffs’ case 
could exceed one million dollars, where the average merchant could expect only $5252 
in trebled damages). 
 71. See id. (citing the economist’s affidavit stating it would be economically 
irrational to pursue a claim individually when the expected damages would only pay a 
small fraction of the expert fees necessary to make a plaintiff’s case). 
 72. See id. at 206, 219 (holding that when a plaintiff can sufficiently demonstrate 
that pursuing arbitration individually would be prohibitively expensive, an arbitration 
agreement containing a class action waiver is unenforceable). 
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was barred from collective action, valid grounds existed for revocation of 
the class action waiver under the FAA.73  Recognizing that the burden lies 
on the party seeking to avoid arbitration to prove the likelihood of incurring 
prohibitive costs, the court held that the plaintiffs had sufficiently met their 
burden.74  In other words, the court applied the vindication of rights 
doctrine to hold that a class action waiver can make arbitration 
prohibitively expensive when the plaintiff can show the costs of arbitrating 
individually would dwarf its recovery.75 
According to the Second Circuit, Concepcion only analyzed when state 
contract law is preempted by the FAA, while its holding concerned whether 
a litigant could effectively vindicate a federal statutory right in 
arbitration.76  In particular, the Second Circuit found that the federal 
antitrust statutory scheme explicitly intended to encourage private 
enforcement by awarding treble damages and reasonable attorney’s fees 
and costs under the Clayton Act.77  The court also found that the fee-
shifting provisions awarded under the Clayton Act would be insufficient to 
fully compensate the plaintiffs.78  Because most attorneys counsel plaintiffs 
on a contingency-fee basis, no competent attorney would take on such a 
complex antitrust case when she could not expect to make a profit even if 
she wins the case.79  Removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonable means of 
                                                          
 73. See id. at 210 (finding Green Tree controlling to the extent it holds an 
arbitration agreement is unenforceable if a plaintiff demonstrates arbitration would be 
prohibitively expensive). 
 74. See id. at 210-12 (finding the economist’s affidavit credible in establishing that 
American Express’s agreement ensures no merchant will seek to vindicate its rights by 
removing the plaintiffs’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery). 
 75. See id. at 219 (emphasizing that it was not holding that class action waivers in 
arbitration agreements are per se unenforceable, but rather that each waiver should be 
analyzed by its effect on the particular parties’ ability to arbitrate). 
 76. See id. at 213-14, 219 (recognizing that Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen 
prohibited courts from requiring parties to submit to class arbitration absent an express 
agreement to do so, but noting that its holding would make no such requirement). 
 77. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig. (Italian Colors I), 554 F.3d 300, 317-18 
(2d Cir. 2009)  (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the Clayton Act would provide 
the plaintiffs with sufficient financial incentives to arbitrate individually because even 
those provisions were inadequate to fully recoup their expenses), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 
2401 (2010), aff’d, 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), aff’d on reh’g, 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.), 
reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. 
v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 78. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (finding insufficiencies because the 
trebling of small individual damages would not cover the expert fees, and the plaintiffs 
must factor in the risk of losing and recovering no fees at all). 
 79. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F. 3d 25, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting that 
plaintiffs’ attorney in antitrust suits make huge upfront expenditures and factor in the 
uncertainty of success). 
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recovery was troubling to the court due to the effect it would have on the 
role of private citizens in supplementing the government’s efforts to 
enforce the antitrust laws.80  Further, Green Tree does not limit the forms 
of prohibitive costs to those unique to arbitration, such as the filing fee and 
the cost for the arbitrator, and other circuits have concluded that the 
relevant inquiry is how expensive arbitration would be in toto from the 
claimant’s point of view.81 
2. The Supreme Court Held That the Vindication of Rights Doctrine, If It 
Indeed Exists, Does Not Apply to Arbitration Agreements That Do Not 
Implicate the “Right to Pursue” a Claim Under Federal Law. 
 On June 20, 2013, the Supreme Court, in a 5-3 decision,82 reversed the 
Second Circuit and held that American Express’s arbitration agreement was 
enforceable.83  The Court reasoned that the FAA requires courts to 
“rigorously enforce” arbitration agreements, even when a violation of a 
federal statute is at issue, “unless the FAA’s mandate has been overridden 
by a contrary congressional command.”84   Focusing on the plaintiffs’ 
complaint that the arbitration agreement included a class action waiver, the 
Court determined that neither the antitrust laws nor congressional approval 
of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was such a “congressional 
command.”  First, the antitrust laws themselves say nothing about class 
actions and those laws were enacted before class actions were fully 
contemplated.85  Neither, the Court reasoned, does congressional approval 
                                                          
 80. See Italian Colors I, 554 F.3d at 312-13 (indicating that class actions may be 
the only effective mechanism for private parties bringing antitrust actions to effectively 
vindicate their rights). 
 81. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (believing “the proper inquiry under Gilmer is not where the money goes but 
rather the amount of money that ultimately will be paid” because plaintiffs would be 
deterred from pursuing their statutory rights no matter who receives their funds). 
      82.  The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, was joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas.  Justice Kagan, joined by Justices 
Breyer and Ginsburg, dissented.  Justice Sotomayor, who was on the panel in the first 
decision in the Second Circuit, was recused. 
     83.  Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) 
(concluding that the FAA did not permit a court, before requiring the parties to 
arbitrate, to make a determination on a case-by-case basis that the plaintiffs could cost-
effectively produce the evidence necessary to succeed on the merits of their underlying 
claim). 
      84.  See id. at 2309 (quoting CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct 665, 669 
(2012) (emphasizing the FAA’s mandate that courts require parties to submit to 
arbitration with whom the parties agreed to arbitrate and under the terms to which the 
parties assented) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
    85.  See id. at 2309-10 (noting that Rule 23, which provides for class certification if 
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of class certification in certain circumstances amount to an entitlement to 
such proceedings when federal statutory rights are at issue.86   
The Court concluded that the language in Mitsubishi Motors invoked by 
the Second Circuit in favor of recognizing the vindication of rights doctrine 
is purely dicta, because the Mitsubishi Motors Court declined to invalidate 
the arbitration agreement at issue.87  Additionally, the Court emphasized 
that the concern espoused by Mitsubishi Motors was a plaintiff’s “right to 
pursue” statutory remedies.88  According to the Court, a plaintiff’s “right to 
pursue” a federal statutory claim is only abridged if the agreement on its 
face bars the claim.  In other words, the cost of proving a federal statutory 
claim is a consideration apart from a plaintiff’s right to pursue that claim, 
and only the latter can affect the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement.89  As such, because a class action waiver still, on its face, 
preserves a party’s right to bring a claim individually in arbitration, there is 
no need under Mitsubishi Motors or the FAA to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement on that basis.90  While the Court conceded that an agreement in 
which the drafter imposed extremely high administrative fees could affect a 
party’s right to pursue a statutory claim, the Court concluded that a claim 
that would be expensive to prove did not, in and of itself, interfere with that 
right.91 
The Court also broadened the holding in Concepcion.  Rather than 
confining the holding to preemption and the Discover Bank rule’s 
                                                          
certain qualifications are met, was enacted much later than the Sherman and Clayton 
Acts). 
    86.  See id. at 2310 (pointing out that it is difficult for plaintiffs to meet all of the 
requirements of Rule 23, so much so that most cases do not get past the class 
certification stage).  
    87.  See id. at 2310 & n.2 (noting that the Court in Mitsubishi Motors rejected the 
contention that arbitration in that case was inadequate and that the Second Circuit also 
addressed the same language as dicta). 
    88.  See id. at 2310-11 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 437 U.S. 614, 637 n.9 (1985)) 
(positing that the “right to pursue statutory remedies” would be affected by a provision 
that explicitly precluded a party from bringing a certain claim, or possibly an 
agreement that imposed high administrative fees, but not the kind of claim brought by 
the merchants). 
    89.  See id. (positing that an agreement explicitly barring Sherman Act claims, or 
imposing extremely high administrative fees, would on its face be exculpatory and 
would not be permissible). 
    90.  See id. at 2311 (opining that the “right to pursue” a statutory remedy is not 
impinged simply because it is not economically worthwhile to expend the money 
necessary to prove that claim). 
    91.  See id. (asserting that a class action waiver only prevents multiple plaintiffs 
from asserting a claim against a defendant but does not prevent any one plaintiff from 
bringing that claim). 
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impermissible categorical ban on class action waivers, the Court opined 
that Concepcion “established . . . that the FAA’s command to enforce 
arbitration agreements trumps any interest in ensuring the prosecution of 
low-value claims.”92  Because the Second Circuit in Italian Colors 
similarly sought to preserve small-dollar claims through invalidating 
arbitration agreements, the Court reasoned that the merchants’ claim must 
fail.93  Moreover, the Court concluded that the case-by-case test established 
by the Second Circuit would impose significant procedural barriers before 
parties could proceed with arbitration, which in turn would interfere with 
the purpose of the FAA—to promote streamlined resolution of disputes in 
arbitration.94 
3. The Dissent Argued That the Vindication of Rights Doctrine Should 
Apply to an Arbitration Agreement That “Effectively” Interferes With a 
Claimant’s Ability to Bring a Claim in Arbitration. 
 The dissent asserted that the vindication of rights doctrine requires 
invalidation of an arbitration agreement “when (but only when) it operates 
to confer immunity from potentially meritorious claims.”95  The arbitration 
agreement crafted by American Express, the dissent argued, has the same 
effect as an arbitration agreement that is exculpatory on its face—the 
agreement might as well have stated that “Merchants may bring no 
Sherman Act claims.”96  The latter clause unquestionably would be 
unenforceable as a clear waiver of the right to bring those claims.97  The 
dissent reasoned that the vindication of rights doctrine should not be 
limited to provisions that are so “baldly exculpatory,” because drafters 
could get around it by crafting clauses that merely have the same effect.98  
                                                          
    92.  See id. at 2312 & n.5 (stating that the interest in ensuring the viability of small-
dollar claims is unaffected by the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements). 
    93.  See id. (asserting that the interest in preserving small-dollar claims in 
arbitration was “unrelated” the principles arising out of the FAA). 
    94.  See id. at 2312 (opining that the imposition of such procedures would 
“undoubtedly destroy the prospect of speedy resolution” that was the purpose of the 
FAA’s mandate to favor enforcement of arbitration agreements). 
    95.  See id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the vindication of rights 
doctrine harmonizes the FAA’s principles with other federal statutes). 
    96.  See id. at 2313-14 (opining that the latter clause would be unenforceable, even 
in an arbitration agreement, for interfering with Congress’s clear intention to encourage 
private citizens to bring antitrust claims).  
    97.  See id. (noting that a prospective waiver of the right to bring an antitrust 
agreement is unenforceable in any kind of contract, including an arbitration 
agreement). 
    98.  See id. at 2314 (illustrating that setting filing fees at extremely high levels, 
requiring a statute of limitations of one day, or limiting the remedies an arbitrator may 
award would have the same effect as a clause that explicitly barred a federal statutory 
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Prohibiting any claimant from introducing economic studies or testimony, 
for example, has the same effect as a clause that plainly bars Sherman Act 
claims because no plaintiff can successfully bring an antitrust claim 
without such evidence.99  The dissent argued that the vindication of rights 
doctrine has to cover both scenarios if it is to have any effect at all, and if it 
is going to comply with the Court’s precedent.100  Indeed, the Court has 
held that claims are only arbitrable “so long as the prospective litigant 
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral 
forum.”101   
The dissent pointed out that the vindication of rights doctrine “furthers 
the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman Act, but of the FAA itself” 
because the policy behind the FAA is to promote the efficient resolution of 
claims, not to prevent potentially meritorious low-dollar claims from 
coming to fruition.102  By declining to recognize the doctrine for the kind of 
claim brought by Italian Colors, the dissent argued that the Court is 
sanctioning companies to draft arbitration agreements that make it 
impossible to resolve a dispute.103  In enacting Section Two of the FAA, 
Congress envisioned a process in which more arbitration takes place and 
claimants may effectively enforce federal and state law, not a process in 
which plaintiffs are, for all intents and purposes, precluded from doing 
so.104  Furthermore, because the bar is high for the kinds of claims that 
would fall under the rule—those in which the claimant would face 
prohibitive costs or some other impenetrable barrier to arbitration—and the 
                                                          
claim). 
    99.  See id. (positing that a provision preventing a party from gathering the evidence 
necessary to successfully bring a claim should similarly be unenforceable because it 
would permit a company like American Express to use its market power to perpetuate 
its monopoly). 
   100.  See id. (arguing that the Court reached the wrong result because the Court’s 
precedent establishes that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if the agreement 
effectively precludes prospective litigants from vindicating their federal statutory rights 
in arbitration). 
   101.  Accord Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 437 U.S. 614, 
637 (1985) (calling upon courts to invalidate arbitration agreements if they require 
parties to effectively waive their rights to bring federal statutory claims). 
   102.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2315 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
FAA sought to promote efficient resolution of claims, not to devise a way for parties to 
attain de facto liability for their violations of the law). 
   103.  See id. (asserting that drafters could devise countless ways to prevent parties 
from bringing claims in arbitration without running afoul of Mitsubishi Motors under 
the Court’s reasoning). 
   104.  See id. (determining that the purposes of the FAA would be compromised by 
permitting drafters to get around arbitration because the FAA mandates courts to 
promote such procedures). 
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claimant’s case must be grounded in “concrete proof,” the vindication of 
rights doctrine would only invalidate a small number of agreements and 
therefore would not interfere with the efficient resolution of most claims in 
arbitration.105 
Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the dissent argued that the language 
in Mitsubishi Motors was not dictum:  the Court there held that claims are 
arbitrable “so long as the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate their 
rights.”106  The Court in Green Tree, moreover, applied that rule to 
emphasize that prohibitive costs could prevent plaintiffs from effectively 
vindicating their rights.107  The majority’s contention that the rule only 
covers agreements that prevent the “right to pursue statutory remedies,” the 
dissent contended, ignores the principle espoused by Mitsubushi Motors 
and Green Tree; “[w]hen an arbitration agreement prevents the effective 
vindication of statutory rights, a party may go to court.”108  This principle 
would indeed cover the agreements the majority accepts, but it would also 
cover an agreement that is not exculpatory on its face but has the same 
effect.109  The dissent disagreed with the majority’s contention that Green 
Tree limited the relevant “prohibitive costs” to filing fees or the arbitrator’s 
compensation, and therefore its holding could apply to any arbitration 
agreement that would make pursuing a claim prohibitively expensive, 
however that may be.110 
Applying the vindication of rights doctrine to the case at hand, the 
                                                          
   105.  See id. at 2315-16 (noting that the Court has placed significant limits on the 
kinds of claims that warrant invalidating an arbitration agreement under the vindication 
of rights doctrine though evidentiary burdens and a narrow focus). 
   106.  See id. at 2317 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Mitsubishi Motors 
Court only declined to decide whether the particular arbitration agreement “in fact” 
effectively preluded the claimant from vindicating its federal statutory rights, but 
explicitly stated that if it did have that effect, the Court would condemn it). 
   107.  See id. at 2315-16 (noting that the Court in Green Tree expounded on the 
principle in Mitsubishi Motors and applied it to the situation in which a claimant would 
realize prohibitive costs in arbitration). 
   108.  See id. at 2317 (arguing that the distinction drawn by the Court to deny the 
merchants the benefit of the vindication of rights doctrine was improper in light of the 
principle arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree). 
   109.  See id. at 2317-18 (citing Mitsubishi Motors, 437 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)) 
(maintaining that agreements that merely have an exculpatory effect should be 
condemned because they still “operate . . . as a prospective waiver of a party’s [federal 
right[s]”) (alteration in original). 
   110.  See id. at 2318 (“[Green Tree] gave no hint of distinguishing among the 
different ways an arbitration agreement can make a claim too costly to bring.  Its 
rationale applies whenever an agreement makes the vindication of federal claims 
impossibly expensive—whether by imposing fees or proscribing cost-sharing or 
adopting some other device.”) 
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dissent argued that the agreement should have been invalidated because 
Italian Colors presented solid evidence that the arbitration agreement acted 
as a “prospective waiver” of the ability to bring an antitrust claim.111  The 
plaintiffs proffered an expert economist affidavit submitting that they 
would have to pay anywhere from several hundred thousand dollars to one 
million dollars for an expert market study, and would only receive one 
tenth of that amount in damages.112  This affidavit, combined with 
American Express’s prohibition on class actions, joinder, or any kind of 
information sharing that could facilitate cost sharing among merchants, 
fulfilled both the “prohibitive cost” requirement and the “concrete proof 
requirement.”113 
The dissent also argued that the majority’s perception of the merchants’ 
claims was unduly limited.114  The merchants indeed contested the class 
action waiver, but only because the cumulative effect of the waiver and the 
other provisions in the agreement that precluded any cost sharing or cost 
shifting made individual arbitration economically impracticable.115  An 
agreement that included a class action waiver but provided for cost shifting 
to the successful party, for example, might still provide an avenue for 
effective vindication of federal statutory rights.116  The Second Circuit 
stated that a class action was the “only economically feasible means” for 
Italian Colors to pursue a claim after determining that the agreement also 
foreclosed all other avenues that would reduce an individual merchant’s 
costs.117  Italian Colors only sought to confirm that an arbitration agreement 
                                                          
   111.  See id. at 2316 (noting that it would be economically irrational for a merchant 
to attempt to pursue an antitrust claim individually against American Express because 
the cost of the necessary expert study would be ten times the potential recovery). 
   112.  See id. (arguing that this assertion constituted a legitimate “prohibitive costs” 
argument that should have been undertaken by the majority). 
   113.  See id. (arguing that, based on the facts in the record, the merchants could not 
succeed in proving their antitrust claim in arbitration without proffering the expensive 
economic study, and therefore American Express’s arbitration agreement should have 
been invalidated because it foreclosed any possible way for the merchants to present 
that study). 
   114.  See id. at 2318 (maintaining that the Court improperly viewed the merchants’ 
claim as solely about class actions because the merchants challenged the effect of the 
entire agreement as a whole). 
   115.  See id. (illustrating that a class action waiver could be legitimate if it were 
coupled with another provision that facilitated some form of cost sharing or cost 
shifting, thereby enabling the merchants to feasibly pursue an antitrust claim in 
arbitration). 
   116.  Id. 
   117.  See id. at 2318-19 (noting that the Second Circuit considered whether 
American Express would assume the merchants’ costs if the merchants were successful 
in arbitration or would permit the merchants to share information so that they could 
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would be invalidated if the plaintiffs could sufficiently demonstrate that the 
agreement effectively was so prohibitively expensive that the plaintiffs 
were effectively barred from arbitrating their disputes.118 
Finally, the dissent posited that Concepcion was not relevant to the 
disposition of this case.119  The plaintiffs in Concepcion were solely 
challenging a class action waiver even though the parties could vindicate 
their rights without it, whereas the merchants here challenged the 
arbitration agreement as a whole because it impaired the merchants’ ability 
to vindicate their rights.120  The dissent asserted that Concepcion could not 
control this case because the Discover Bank rule in Concepcion was 
dismissed on preemption grounds, but the Court could not use those same 
grounds when a federal law was at issue.121  As such, the Court did not 
address the vindication of rights doctrine in Concepcion, nor could it, 
because the case did not concern federal law.122  The dissent pointed out 
that Concepcion made no mention of Mitsubishi Motors or Green Tree, and 
the parties conceded that the Concepcions were likely to be made whole 
even in bilateral arbitration.123  Because the vindication of rights doctrine 
applied to the merchants’ claims and was supported by the Court’s 
precedents, three justices on the Court dissented. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. American Express’s Arbitration Agreement Should Have Been 
Invalidated Because the Agreement Prevented the Plaintiffs From 
Vindicating Their Rights, Thereby Falling Directly Under the Savings 
                                                          
share an expert market study). 
   118.  Accord Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 210-11 (2d Cir. 2012), overruled by 
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (asserting that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating 
that they would incur costs that were prohibitive if they were forced to proceed with 
individual arbitration). 
   119.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2319-20 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (reiterating that 
because Italian Colors did not solely challenge the class action waiver, Concepcion 
cannot directly control the merchants’ claims). 
   120.  See id. at 2320 (positing that the only way the Court can assert Concepcion’s 
relevance is through its “false pretense” that the merchants were requiring the Court to 
solely consider and invalidate the class action waiver). 
   121.  See id. (noting that Concepcion could not have implicated the vindication of 
rights doctrine because the doctrine only applies to cases of two competing federal 
statutes, not when a state law allegedly frustrates the FAA). 
   122.  See id. (stating that, contrary to the federal antitrust laws, the Court is not 
concerned in vindicating a state law that conflicts with a federal law). 
   123.  See id. (asserting that Concepcion cannot be directly on point when the Court 
did not cite the most relevant precedents establishing and applying the vindication of 
rights doctrine). 
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Clause of the FAA. 
1. The Vindication of Rights Test as Established in Italian Colors Is a 
Defense That Falls Under the Savings Clause of the FAA. 
The vindication of rights doctrine as to the claims brought by the 
merchants in Italian Colors falls squarely within the savings clause of 
Section Two of the FAA.124  Under Section Two, arbitration agreements 
can be revoked “upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”125  This places the burden on the court to 
determine whether a particular defense offered by a plaintiff to avoid 
arbitration would be recognized under state contract law.126  Any kind of 
contract that acts as a prospective waiver of a defendant’s liability could 
not be enforced under state or federal law because it is unconscionable.127  
The vindication of rights doctrine is analogous to this general 
unconscionability principle, which is a valid defense under Section Two so 
long as it does not arise specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at 
issue.128 
Under the Second Circuit’s reasoning, a contract is unenforceable if it 
effectively prevents the plaintiff from bringing a claim in any forum, not 
just the arbitral forum, and the court found enforcement of the arbitration 
agreement here would give the merchants no forum to enforce their 
rights.129  In other words, the rule applied by the Second Circuit focuses on 
                                                          
 124. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 219 (acknowledging the FAA embodies a 
strong policy favoring arbitration but holding a class action waiver that precludes 
effective vindication of statutory rights is unenforceable). 
 125. See, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987) (noting that 
traditional contract defenses can revoke an arbitration agreement so long as they do not 
arise specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at issue). 
 126. See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (recognizing 
that courts may interpret arbitration agreements and invalidate them for contract 
defenses such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability under the FAA savings clause). 
 127. Compare Am. Online, Inc. v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App. 4th 1, 17-18 (2001) 
(finding a waiver of class actions in litigation unconscionable under Discover Bank 
because it was exculpatory), with Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47-48, 52-53 
(1st Cir. 2006) (finding an arbitration clause prohibiting treble damages, attorney fees, 
and class actions was unenforceable because it prevented the vindication of federal 
statutory rights). 
 128. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) (noting 
that the savings clause could not be construed to uphold state law that impedes the 
FAA’s objectives). 
 129. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir.) (noting that enforcing the 
class action waiver in this case would eradicate the only viable avenue for plaintiffs to 
vindicate their rights, thus granting American Express “de facto immunity” for their 
wrongdoing (quoting Italian Colors I, 554 F.3d 300, 320 (2d Cir. 2009)), reh’g en banc 
22
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/7
2013] DISTINGUISHING CONCEPCION 973 
the end result, not the means through which a particular plaintiff may 
pursue a claim.130  The rule favors the arbitration agreement only to the 
extent that arbitration merely represents a change in forum and does not 
compromise the fundamental rights or remedies available under the 
applicable federal statute, such as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.131  If a 
contract generally could not lawfully invoke a class action waiver that 
would effectively prevent a plaintiff from bringing a claim, a court could 
not uphold such a de facto waiver of liability just because it arises in an 
arbitration agreement.132 
The plaintiffs in Italian Colors did not proffer a defense that arises 
specifically because an agreement to arbitrate is at issue, nor did they truly 
contest arbitration at all.133  Rather, the cumulative effect of the provisions 
in the arbitration agreement prevented them from bringing their antitrust 
claims in any forum, not just the arbitral forum.134  This is the exact sort of 
contractual agreement Congress intended to prohibit in enacting the savings 
clause of the FAA, and it falls squarely under the plain meaning of that 
clause.135 By commanding that arbitration agreements be held 
unenforceable for the same defenses that would render any contract 
unenforceable, Congress intended to ensure that a defendant could not 
escape liability merely by inserting an exculpatory clause in an arbitration 
                                                          
denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 130. See id. at 219 (stating that its holding does not render all class action waivers in 
antitrust actions unenforceable and requires each waiver to be analyzed on a case-by-
case basis). 
 131. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) 
(emphasizing that arbitration of statutory claims works because it typically provides 
another forum for plaintiffs to resolve their statutory claims). 
 132. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 211 (finding that the class action waiver 
could not be enforced because it would grant American Express “de facto immunity 
from antitrust liability” (quoting Italian Colors I, 554 F.3d at 320)). 
 133. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 28, In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 2006 
WL 6198567 (2d Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1871-cv) (noting that the class action waiver, if 
applied in court, would still be subject to revocation). 
 134. See id. (contending that the provisions in the arbitration agreement effectively 
“operate as a prospective waiver” of the merchants’ right to bring antitrust claims 
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
n.13 (1985))). 
 135. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (doubting that Congress intended to 
eliminate the express private right of action in our antitrust laws in light of its “strong 
private enforcement mechanisms and incentives”); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 
U.S. at 637 n.19 (acknowledging the Court would readily condemn an agreement under 
the FAA that effectively operated as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies). 
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agreement.136  To hold otherwise would be to place agreements to arbitrate 
on a higher footing than other contracts, which goes beyond the confines of 
the FAA and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the savings clause.137 
2. The Vindication of Rights Doctrine Limits the Application of the FAA 
and the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements by Ensuring the 
Substantive Rights Under the Antitrust Laws Remain in Force. 
As the Second Circuit noted, Concepcion plainly determined whether a 
state contract law was preempted.138  It did not purport to hold as a matter 
of law that a court could never invalidate a class action waiver in an 
arbitration agreement.139  Because Italian Colors relied on federal antitrust 
law rather than state law, Concepcion does not directly control the question 
presented.140  Instead, the Court should have reconciled Congress’s 
established mandate favoring arbitration without construing that mandate 
so broadly as to negate the Sherman and Clayton Acts.141 
Thus, even if the vindication of rights doctrine as applied in Italian 
Colors does not fall squarely under Section Two, it is still necessary to 
ensure that courts are not enforcing arbitration agreements to the detriment 
of conflicting federal statutes such as the Sherman and Clayton Acts.142  As 
the dissent correctly pointed out, the vindication of rights doctrine “furthers 
the purposes not just of laws like the Sherman Act, but of the FAA itself” 
because the doctrine ensures that meritorious small-dollar claims are still 
                                                          
 136. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967) (recognizing that immunizing an arbitration agreement from judicial challenge 
despite its unlawful exculpatory effect would be inconsistent with the savings clause). 
 137. See id. (recognizing that courts may not make arbitration agreements more 
enforceable than other contracts). 
 138. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 212 (finding that Concepcion does not 
directly control the question presented because its holding was grounded in preemption 
law). 
 139. See id. at 214, 216-17 (noting that Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion do not require 
all class action waivers to be per se enforceable and leaving later courts to decide 
whether a class action waiver is enforceable when the litigants face prohibitive costs). 
 140. See id. at 213 (positing that Concepcion merely provided the basis for 
determining when state contract law impedes the objectives of the FAA, while its 
holding rested on “federal law of arbitrability”). 
 141. See Int’l Union of Elec. Radio and Mach. Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 289 
F.2d 757, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (discussing that conflicts between two federal statutes 
should be resolved in a way that gives effect to the latest statute and still allows the 
earlier statute to be operative). 
 142. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (holding that a court should 
not interpret a statute in a way that would render enforcement of an earlier statute 
impracticable). 
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viable while also promoting the efficient resolution of claims.143  The 
FAA’s mandate to favor arbitration was intended to encourage parties to 
arbitrate, not to encourage drafters to craft agreements that made it 
impracticable to ever reach the arbitral forum.144  The vindication of rights 
doctrine, therefore, reconciles the FAA’s mandate to enforce the terms of 
arbitration agreements with the merchants’ right in Italian Colors to bring 
an antitrust claim.145  The vindication of rights doctrine gives effect to both 
the FAA and the Sherman Act by enforcing mandatory arbitration 
agreements according to their terms, but only to the extent that the 
particular claimant can vindicate the particular rights at issue in each 
case.146  Enforcing arbitration agreements with the caveat that prospective 
litigants may effectively vindicate their rights preserves the substantive 
rights afforded by federal statutes and still ensures that arbitration 
agreements are generally enforced according to their terms.147  Holding the 
merchant agreement enforceable notwithstanding a clear demonstration of 
prohibitive costs would undermine the antitrust laws’ encouragement of 
private actions because the instant parties would be unable to enforce those 
laws.148  To weigh in favor of an arbitration agreement when there is 
substantial evidence demonstrating that the merchants could not effectively 
vindicate their federal statutory rights would only give effect to the FAA 
and, thus, fail to balance the interests of both federal statutes.149 
                                                          
   143. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2315 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that the FAA envisioned more arbitration and did 
not intend to promote exculpatory clauses that inhibit access to arbitration).   
   144. See id. (“What the FAA prefers to litigation is arbitration, not de facto 
immunity.”). 
 145. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 213 (holding that an arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable only when the provisions effectively “defeat the remedial purpose of the 
statute” (quoting Paladino v. Avnet Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th 
Cir. 1998))). 
 146. See id. at 216. (citing Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 
1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999)) (recognizing that the FAA’s policy favoring arbitration, 
even when federal statutory claims are at issue, is not without bounds). 
 147. See generally Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate 
Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 628 
(2012) (reasoning that Green Tree provides a compromise between the FAA and 
competing statutes by requiring the plaintiff to prove the likelihood of incurring 
prohibitive costs). 
 148. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 (1975) (concluding that as long as a potential litigant may effectively vindicate its 
statutory claim in arbitration, the statute continues to serve its function). 
 149. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 865 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(concluding that absent a clear expression from Congress that it intended one federal 
statute to preempt another, courts must give two federal statutes simultaneous effect). 
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Because the government does not have the resources to investigate and 
prosecute every antitrust violation, the ability of private citizens to 
supplement their efforts is necessary to ensure antitrust laws are adequately 
enforced.150  Congress provided for treble damages to successful private 
plaintiffs in the antitrust law scheme to encourage private parties to 
prosecute antitrust violations.151  Moreover, because it is difficult and 
expensive to prove an antitrust claim, class actions may be the only 
mechanism for private parties to have both the means and the incentive to 
bring a claim.152  Thus, the Court should allow the parties to proceed as a 
class if individual arbitration is impracticable.153  This is not to say that the 
class action procedure is necessary to bringing an antitrust claim.154  Once a 
court recognizes that a plaintiff, encouraged by Congress to bring private 
actions, would face such prohibitive costs that it would not be able to bring 
a claim individually, that court should allow the claim to proceed as a 
class.155  In the case at bar, because the merchants provided an expert 
                                                          
 150. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (noting that there are 
nearly twenty times more private antitrust suits than actions filed by the Department of 
Justice). 
 151. See id. at 343-44 (noting that the provisions of the Clayton Act were meant to 
encourage private citizens to enforce antitrust laws and deter future violations). 
 152. See, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 322, 339 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(recognizing the large expense of research and expert fees necessary for a plaintiff to 
prove an antitrust claim (citing Welsch v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589, 596-98 (D. Minn. 
1975))). 
 153. See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980) (recognizing 
that class actions may motivate plaintiffs to bring cases that might not be brought 
otherwise, thereby vindicating the rights of others who may not find it worthwhile to 
bring a claim). 
 154. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
633-34 (1985) (holding that antitrust actions are not inherently inconsistent with 
bilateral arbitration). 
 155. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 129 (1986) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) (noting it would be odd for an antitrust statute to define a violation in 
such a fashion that no private party could enforce it).  This point, of course, is not 
without limits.  The vindication of rights doctrine does not permit plaintiffs to vindicate 
their federal statutory rights no matter what obstacle they face.  Plaintiffs could not 
invoke the doctrine, for example, if they did not meet Rule 23’s class certification 
requirements or if they did not file their claim before the statute of limitations tolled. 
The doctrine only states that Congress did not intend for the FAA to prevail when 
arbitration agreements no longer represent merely a change in forum, but rather require 
parties to waive rights they would otherwise have possessed.  See Gilmer v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 32 (1991) (emphasizing that arbitration of 
statutory claims works because it typically provides another forum for plaintiffs to 
resolve their statutory claims); Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (noting that a 
plaintiff can effectively vindicate substantive rights afforded by federal statutes as long 
as arbitration is merely a change in forum). 
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economist’s affidavit proving they could not feasibly bring a claim 
individually, the vindication of rights doctrine should be ratified and the 
plaintiffs should be able to aggregate their claims.156 
B. The Supreme Court Incorrectly Applied the Vindication of Rights 
Doctrine as Required By Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree. 
The Second Circuit in Italian Colors applied the vindication of rights 
doctrine arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree to determine 
whether the merchants could effectively vindicate their rights in bilateral 
arbitration.157  Under Mitsubishi Motors, the inquiry is whether arbitration 
merely provides a different forum or whether the plaintiffs would have to 
forgo the substantive rights under the applicable federal statute.158  Under 
Green Tree, courts must analyze whether the plaintiff would incur such 
prohibitive costs in arbitration that enforcing the arbitration clause would 
preclude a plaintiff from bringing a claim in any forum.159  The Supreme 
Court in Italian Colors incorrectly applied these precedents by assuming 
that an arbitration agreement that was not facially exculpatory would not 
interfere with a plaintiff’s ability to vindicate her federal statutory rights in 
the arbitral forum.160 
1. Under Mitsubishi Motors, the Substantive Rights Afforded by the 
Federal Antitrust Laws Would Be Compromised if the Arbitration 
Agreement Was Enforced. 
Mitsubishi Motors requires arbitration agreements to be enforceable so 
long as they do not undermine the relevant statutory scheme.161  Here, 
                                                          
 156. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir.) (citing Italian Colors I, 554 
F.3d 300, 319 (2d Cir. 2009), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. 
granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012)), 
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (emphasizing that American Express did not truly 
contest that plaintiffs could not feasibly pursue a claim individually in federal court or 
in arbitration). 
 157. See id. at 214-18 (analyzing Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree to hold that the 
vindication of rights doctrine requires American Express’s arbitration agreement to be 
held unenforceable). 
 158. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628 (noting that a plaintiff can effectively 
vindicate substantive rights afforded by federal statutes as long as arbitration is merely 
a change in forum). 
 159. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) 
(recognizing that prohibitive arbitration costs could preclude a plaintiff from effectively 
vindicating her rights). 
 160. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 214-17 (holding that the class action waiver 
precluded the merchants’ only reasonably feasible means of recovery, making the 
arbitration agreement unenforceable). 
 161. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 627 (noting that a party typically does not 
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however, enforcement of the arbitration agreement would undermine the 
statutory scheme under the Sherman and Clayton Acts by compromising 
the merchants’ ability to complement the government’s efforts to enforce 
the antitrust laws.162 
As Mitsubishi Motors expressed, Congress did not indicate that antitrust 
violations should not be subjected to arbitration, nor is there any inherent 
conflict.163  By enforcing an agreement that makes arbitration exponentially 
more costly than the claim is worth, however, the antitrust laws’ remedial 
and deterrent functions potentially may no longer serve their purpose.164  
Because the Clayton Act provides for trebled damages and reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs, Congress intended to encourage private citizens 
to bring antitrust actions to supplement the efforts of state and federal 
government.165  If a corporation can craft an arbitration agreement that 
makes pursuing a claim prohibitively expensive, private suits will not be 
brought in any forum and the statute will not function properly.166  Thus, 
one of the factors that was not present in Mitsubishi Motors is present here: 
if the arbitration agreement is specifically enforced, the plaintiffs would be 
forced to forgo their substantive rights under the statute because they would 
not be able to effectively vindicate their rights under the antitrust laws.167  
Further, the statutory scheme of the antitrust laws would be undermined 
because those private citizens seeking to enforce the antitrust laws would 
be unable to bring a claim in any forum.168  Accordingly, the first prong of 
                                                          
forgo the substantive rights afforded by federal statutes simply by agreeing to arbitrate 
a statutory claim). 
 162. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 210-11 (emphasizing that eradicating the 
private enforcement component from the antitrust law scheme cannot be what Congress 
intended when it included strong private enforcement mechanisms and incentives in the 
antitrust statutes). 
 163. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 632-35 (determining from the text and 
legislative history of the Sherman Act that arbitration was not inherently consistent 
with effective vindication of the federal antitrust laws). 
 164. See id. at 637 (indicating that a federal statute would not continue to serve its 
remedial and deterrent functions if the prospective litigant may not effectively 
vindicate its statutory cause of action). 
 165. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972) (holding that 
Congress encouraged private citizens to serve as “private attorneys general” by offering 
potential litigants trebled damages and attorney’s fees and costs). 
 166. See Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(recognizing the realistic alternative to a class action is not a multiplicity of individual 
suits, but rather no individual suits, because the cost would dwarf the benefit). 
 167. Cf. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26-29 (1991) 
(finding that the plaintiff could effectively vindicate his rights in arbitration because the 
forum provided for all of the remedies he could have received in litigation). 
 168. Accord Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (recognizing 
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the vindication of rights inquiry under Mitsubishi Motors is satisfied 
because the plaintiffs demonstrated that the functions of the antitrust laws 
would not be in place and arbitration in this instance would tend to 
undermine the statutory scheme.169 
2. The Merchant Plaintiffs Met Their Burden of Proving They Would Incur 
Prohibitive Costs Under Green Tree. 
The plaintiffs in Italian Colors met their burden of proving prohibitive 
costs under Green Tree through an expert economist’s affidavit that 
described the level of expert fees necessary to successfully bring their 
claim and posited that individual actions were financially infeasible.170  The 
expert economist, after conducting initial research, concluded that the cost 
for an expert economic study alone could exceed one million dollars, and 
the average plaintiff could only expect less than six thousand dollars in 
damages even after trebling.171  In his professional opinion, it was not 
realistic for an individual to bring a claim in either arbitration or 
litigation.172  Whereas the plaintiff in Green Tree did not provide any 
evidence as to her likely costs, the plaintiffs in Italian Colors provided a 
detailed affidavit from an expert economist, whose credibility was not 
questioned, attesting to their prohibitive costs.173  Moreover, those costs are 
necessary to handle the complex issues in proving American Express’s 
tying arrangement and are not merely prohibitive in the sense that they do 
                                                          
that the class action may be the only economically rational alternative when a large 
group suffers damages that are individually too small to justify bringing an individual 
action). 
 169. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. at 275 (recognizing that private litigants 
are a necessary aspect of antitrust enforcement to supplement the efforts of the 
government). 
 170. Compare Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) 
(holding that a plaintiff asserting prohibitive costs as a basis for avoiding arbitration 
bears the burden of proving the likelihood of incurring such costs), with Italian Colors 
III, 667 F.3d 204, 218 (2d Cir.) (concluding an expert economist’s affidavit noting the 
economic irrationality of bringing a claim met their burden of production), reh’g en 
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 171. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (noting that expert studies in individual 
antitrust actions typically cost between $300,000 and $2,000,000, and that the 
merchants’ claim would fall within that range). 
 172. See id. (determining that collective proceedings would be the only realistic 
recourse for the plaintiffs where expert fees could cost one million dollars). 
 173. See id. at 218 (noting that American Express did not challenge the validity of 
the economist’s affidavit); see also Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (holding the arbitration 
agreement was enforceable because the plaintiff did not provide any evidence to 
substantiate her prohibitive costs claim). 
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not provide enough incentive to bring a claim.174 
Although most challenges to arbitration agreements have been 
unsuccessful, arbitration agreements containing class action waivers are not 
per se enforceable.175  Though prior Supreme Court precedent has almost 
uniformly enforced arbitration agreements when there was an effective 
vindication defense, the Court has rarely heard a case in which the 
plaintiffs could actually demonstrate that in their specific case it would be 
unjust to enforce the arbitration agreement because the plaintiffs could not 
vindicate their rights.176  The facts of Italian Colors were unique in this 
way because of the extremely high costs of pursuing a claim and the 
remarkably low damages the merchants could expect as a result.177 
The fatal flaw of Mitsubishi Motors was that the plaintiffs attempted to 
persuade the Court to adopt a categorical rule that enforcing the particular 
statute was inconsistent with arbitration.178  In Green Tree, the plaintiff 
made a bare assertion of prohibitive costs with no evidence to substantiate 
her claim.179  By contrast, upholding the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Italian Colors would have simply imposed a case-by-case analysis by 
which a court determines the costs each plaintiff would incur and the 
deterrent effect those costs would have on a plaintiff’s ability to pursue a 
claim.180  Indeed, the Second Circuit found the merchants offered much 
                                                          
 174. See, e.g., Paschall v. Kansas City Star Co., 695 F.2d 332, 339 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(citing Welsh v. Likins, 68 F.R.D. 589, 596-98 (D. Minn. 1975)) (recognizing that the 
enormous expense of research and expert fees are indispensable to a plaintiff’s efforts 
to successfully prove a complex antitrust claim); cf. Coneff v. AT&T Corp, 673 F.3d 
1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the arbitration agreement enforceable when the 
inquiry was not whether the plaintiffs could effectively vindicate their rights but 
whether they had the incentive to bring a claim). 
 175. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217 (qualifying the fact that most plaintiffs 
have not avoided arbitration because of prohibitive costs or their lack of sufficient 
evidence to that end). 
 176. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 10, Italian Colors III, No. 12-133, 
2012 WL 4960369 (noting it would be a rare occurrence for a plaintiff to be able to 
provide sufficient evidence of prohibitive costs to meet the Green Tree test). 
 177. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 218 (finding that enforcement of the class 
action waiver in this case would flatly ensure no small merchant could challenge the 
tying arrangement). 
 178. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
627-35 (1975) (finding unpersuasive the plaintiff’s argument that antitrust actions 
should not be subject to arbitration); accord Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 
500 U.S. 20, 26-27 (1991) (rejecting plaintiff’s contention that ADEA actions as a 
matter of law are incompatible with arbitration). 
 179. See Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90 (finding the plaintiff’s prohibitive cost 
argument did not rise beyond the speculative level). 
 180. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 219 (noting their holding did not render 
arbitration agreements per se unenforceable, and instead required future parties to 
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more than a bare assertion of prohibitive costs, and demonstrated that the 
effect of the class action waiver is that no merchant will bring a claim and 
American Express will not have to comply with the antitrust laws.181  In 
sum, because the plaintiffs in Italian Colors satisfied both prongs of the 
tests arising out of Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree, the arbitration 
agreement should have been invalidated.182 
3. The Supreme Court’s Decision Failed to Apply These Tests and Came To 
The Erroneous Conclusion That The Merchants’ “Right To Pursue” Their 
Federal Statutory Claims Was Unimpaired. 
i. The Court’s Conclusion That the Merchants Did Not Assert a 
Prospective Waiver of Their “Right to Pursue” a Statutory Claim 
Under Mitsubishi Motors Failed to Account for the Practical 
Effect of the Arbitration Agreement as a Whole. 
 The Court rejected the merchants’ assertion that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable as a “prospective waiver” of their federal 
statutory rights because Mitsubishi Motors only condemned an arbitration 
agreement that acts “as a prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue 
statutory remedies.”183  A class action waiver does not interfere with that 
right on its face, the Court reasoned, and therefore cannot be invalidated 
under Mitsubishi Motors.184  Moreover, the Court determined that the 
ability to prove a claim is not synonymous with the “right to pursue” that 
                                                          
litigate the merits of their own waiver based on the particular facts of their case). 
 181. See id. at 218 (recognizing that trebling plaintiff’s expected damages would 
still not pay for the expert fees estimated to be necessary to make a merchant’s case). 
 182. See id. at 216 (citing Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d 
1230, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999) (acknowledging that arbitration is not an adequate 
alternative forum for resolving statutory claims when the arbitration agreement is 
constructed to remove the individual’s ability to bring such a claim). 
   183.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013) 
(citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 
n.9 (1985)) (dismissing the merchants’ argument that American Express’s arbitration 
agreement acted as a prospective waiver of the parties’ federal statutory rights because 
the merchants only had trouble proving their claim).  The Court incorrectly asserted 
that the vindication of rights doctrine as established by Mitsubishi Motors was purely 
dicta.  See id. at 2310 & n.2.  The Court in Mitsubishi Motors quite clearly held that an 
arbitration agreement was only enforceable “so long as the prospective litigant may 
effectively vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”  473 U.S. at 
637.  Still, even if the vindication of rights doctrine originated as dictum, it became law 
when the Court applied its principles in Green Tree to hold that an arbitration 
agreement is unenforceable if it makes arbitration prohibitively expensive.  See Green 
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 513 U.S. 79, 90 (2000). 
   184.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311 (positing that a class action waiver still 
preserves a party’s right to bring a claim individually in arbitration).  
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claim, and therefore the merchants’ claim did not fall under the rule.185 
An arbitration agreement that prevents a party from compiling the proof 
that is necessary to pursue the claim, however, has effectively inhibited the 
party’s “right to pursue” that claim.186   In Mitsubishi Motors, the Court 
stated that when an arbitration agreement “operat[es] . . . as a prospective 
waiver” of a party’s right to pursue a federal statutory claim, it must be 
invalidated.187  The Court also stated that an arbitration agreement is only 
enforceable “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its 
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.”188  Indeed, the Court 
emphasized that an arbitration agreement would be “set[ ] aside” if 
“proceedings in the contractual forum [would] be so gravely difficult” that 
the prospective litigant would “for all practical purposes would be 
deprived of his day in court.”189  Reading these conclusions together makes 
clear that the cumulative effect of the arbitration agreement determines its 
enforceability, not whether any one provision is “baldly exculpatory.”190  
As such, the dissent got it right:  “[w]hen an arbitration agreement prevents 
the effective vindication of statutory rights, a party may go to court.”191   
An arbitration agreement indeed prevents the effective vindication of 
statutory rights when it explicitly prohibits a party from bringing a certain 
claim.192  But an arbitration agreement no less prohibits the effective 
                                                          
   185.  See id. (asserting that the class action waiver itself did not affect the right to 
effective vindication of a statutory claim because class actions were not always 
required to realize such vindication of the rights under the antitrust laws). 
   186.  See id. at 2314 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (illustrating potential examples of 
clauses that would have the same affect as the “baldly exculpatory” provisions that the 
Court would condemn but that would be upheld under the majority’s interpretation of 
the vindication of rights doctrine). 
   187.  See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 
637 n.19 (1985) (stating that the Court would “have no trouble condemning” an 
arbitration agreement whose provisions effectively prevented a party from pursuing a 
federal statutory claim). 
   188.  See id. at 637 (emphasis added) (requiring the parties to arbitrate because there 
had been no argument that the particular arbitration agreement precluded the claimant 
from effectively vindicating its rights in arbitration). 
   189.  See id. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted) (positing that an arbitration 
agreement that was unconscionable would not be enforced under the FAA). 
   190.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2317-18 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (considering 
the “world of other provisions” a drafter could create to limit its liability without 
including a “baldly exculpatory” provision). 
   191.  See id. at 2317 (arguing that the vindication of rights doctrine as perceived by 
Mitsubishi Motors and Green Tree could come in to play in a wide variety of 
circumstances and that a holistic view of the agreement is necessary to determine its 
enforceability). 
   192.  See id. at 2310 (majority opinion) (conceding that an agreement explicitly 
barring a party from bringing a certain federal statutory claim would fall under the 
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vindication of statutory rights when the provisions collectively have the 
same effect, however the drafter is able to realize that result.193  In this case, 
the Court ignored that the merchants essentially no longer have the “right 
to pursue” their antitrust claims because the arbitration agreement 
forecloses all possible ways for the merchants to present an expert report 
necessary to prove their antitrust claims.194  Thus, the merchants still met 
their burden under Mitsubishi Motors because the agreement deprived the 
merchants of any feasible way to vindicate their rights under the antitrust 
laws. 195  
ii. The Court Erroneously Concluded That the Costs Necessary to 
Prove the Merchants’ Antitrust Claims Were Outside of the Scope 
of the Court’s Holding in Green Tree. 
 American Express asserted, and the Court impliedly agreed, that any 
asserted prohibitive costs must be those that are unique to arbitration, such 
as the initial filing fee and the costs for the arbitrator.196  Because the expert 
and attorney’s fees that the merchants claimed were prohibitive were not 
unique to arbitration, those costs cannot be used as a mechanism to avoid 
arbitration.197  The Court couched this conclusion in its determination that a 
prohibitively expensive filing fee—which facially restricts access to the 
arbitral forum—was categorically different from a prohibitively expensive 
expert study that is necessary to prove a claim.198  Still, because the cost to 
prove a claim would be the same in litigation and arbitration absent any 
agreement to the contrary, this is arguably the distinction the Court actually 
drew.199  This reasoning is erroneous and is a misapplication of the holding 
                                                          
vindication of rights doctrine). 
   193.  See id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that any variety of clauses 
could have the same effect as a clause that is blatantly exculpatory, but that still renders 
the clause a “prospective waiver” of a party’s federal statutory rights). 
   194.  See id. at 2320 (lamenting that American Express successfully shielded itself 
from antitrust liability because of the Court’s interpretation of the FAA). 
   195.  See id. at 2316-17 (asserting that the Second Circuit was correct in concluding 
that Italian Colors met its burden under Mitsubishi Motors that the arbitration 
agreement was unenforceable because it effectively precluded the merchants from 
vindicating their rights under the antitrust laws). 
 196. See id. at 2310-11; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18 
(considering Green Tree’s reference to large arbitration costs to mean costs that would 
not be borne in litigation and thus would preclude access to the arbitral forum). 
 197. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2310-11; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra 
note 13, at 19 (arguing that the dicta in Green Tree related to the “price of admission,” 
and did not warrant expansion to include costs that could be incurred in both litigation 
and arbitration). 
   198.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct.  at 2310-11. 
   199.  See id. at 2311 n.3 (“But more importantly, [a clause prohibiting a party from 
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in Green Tree.200   
As a threshold matter, the prohibitive costs asserted by the merchants 
arguably would be unique to arbitration because the class action waiver 
would only apply if American Express elected to use arbitration.201  
Therefore, even assuming prohibitive costs were required to be unique to 
arbitration, the plaintiffs still met their burden of proving prohibitive 
costs.202  Still, this distinction is not in accord with the central holding in 
Green Tree.203 
The Court in Green Tree recognized that a plaintiff could avoid 
arbitration on the “ground that arbitration would be prohibitively 
expensive,” not that filing fees and arbitrator’s costs would be prohibitively 
expensive.204  Nor did the Court state whether the nature of the prohibitive 
expenses had any bearing on the analysis.205  Though the Court referenced 
the cost of admission as the relevant inquiry for prohibitive costs, it did not 
limit the cost of admission to the costs that the plaintiff asserted may be 
prohibitive in her case.206  Put differently, just because the plaintiff in 
                                                          
presenting expert testimony], assuming it makes vindication of a claim impossible, 
makes it impossible not just as a class action but even as an individual claim.”). 
 200. See, e.g., Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 
(4th Cir. 2001) (stating that prohibitive costs are only concerned with the amount of 
money ultimately paid by the plaintiff because plaintiffs would be deterred from 
pursuing their statutory rights no matter who receives their funds). 
 201. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition at 14, Am. Express Co. v, Italian 
Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133 (2012) (noting that the plaintiffs would only be forced 
to pay prohibitive costs under the arbitration agreement but would not have to outside 
arbitration). 
 202. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir.) (finding that the plaintiffs 
met their burden of proving the likelihood of incurring prohibitive costs based on the 
expert economist affidavit), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), 
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
   203.  See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the merchants’ expert study constituted a 
prohibitive cost because “[n]o rational actor would bring a claim worth tens of 
thousands of dollars if doing so meant incurring costs in the hundreds of thousands”). 
 204. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) 
(recognizing that prohibitive costs could prevent a litigant from effectively vindicating 
federal statutory rights, which would make the arbitration agreement unenforceable). 
 205. See id. at 91 (choosing not to analyze what would constitute a sufficient 
demonstration of prohibitive costs because the plaintiff developed no evidentiary 
record on that point). 
 206. See id. at 84 (referencing the potentially prohibitive arbitration costs for a 
plaintiff, including the filing fee and paying the arbitrator); cf. In re Am. Express 
Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.) (Pooler, J., concurring) (noting that the 
merchants were prosecuting claims that would require more extensive proof than other 
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Green Tree claimed that the arbitrator’s compensation and filing fees 
would be prohibitive does not mean that the cost of admission does not 
include anything necessary to bring a successful claim.207  The Supreme 
Court’s conclusion in Italian Colors that the “right to pursue” a federal 
statutory remedy is not implicated by prohibitive costs involved in proving 
that claim does not comport with Green Tree’s analysis.208  The proper 
inquiry is whether an arbitration agreement prevents a party from 
effectively vindicating federal statutory rights because of prohibitive 
expenses, and the Court does not distinguish between potential forms of 
prohibitive costs.209  If the concern is the practical effect arbitration will 
have on a particular litigant’s ability to bring a claim, which it should be 
under Mitsubishi Motors, the form of the expense is almost irrelevant.210  
That the costs are in the form of expert fees makes them no less prohibitive 
from the litigant’s point of view than if they were filing fees or the cost for 
the arbitrator.211  Either way, the litigant is precluded from bringing a 
claim, and the purpose and function of the applicable federal statute is not 
served.212  
Prohibitive costs, additionally, do not need to be unique to arbitration 
because the correct comparison after Concepcion is not between litigation 
                                                          
statutory claims, which later courts could analyze in determining whether plaintiffs 
made their showing of prohibitive costs), denying reh’g en banc to Italian Colors III, 
667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 207. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 201, at 15 (reckoning that the 
analysis in Green Tree acknowledged that arbitration costs could be prohibitively 
expensive, but it did not emphasize that only forum-specific costs were relevant to the 
prohibitive costs inquiry). 
   208.  See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 
(2013) (asserting that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved in proving a 
statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that 
remedy”). 
 209. See id. at 2317 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that that the majority’s 
exclusion of the cost of proof from the prohibitive inquiry was foreclosed by Mitsubishi 
Motors and Green Tree); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646, 660 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 
556 (4th Cir. 2001) (believing the effect on the plaintiffs is the same no matter who 
receives their funds). 
 210. See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 664 (including the fact that attorneys cover most of 
the fees and advance the expenses in litigation into its analysis of whether a plaintiff 
would incur prohibitive costs in arbitration).  
 211. See id. (instructing courts to consider the costs a litigant would face in litigation 
vis-à-vis arbitration, and whether the additional costs of arbitration would deter 
plaintiffs with a statutory claim from bringing that claim in arbitration). 
 212. See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556 (reasoning that a claimant could not be deterred 
from pursuing a claim in arbitration simply because his fees would be paid to the 
arbitrator). 
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and arbitration, but between bilateral arbitration and class arbitration.213  In 
Concepcion, the Court analyzed the differences between bilateral and class 
arbitration to hold that the change from bilateral to class arbitration would 
be fundamental and would completely change the character of the 
proceedings.214  According to the Court, the switch from bilateral to class 
arbitration greatly increases the costs to the defendants in the form of 
greater procedure and higher risks.215  It is appropriate, then, to use the 
same mode of analysis when considering the plaintiff’s costs, rather than 
American Express’s comparison of arbitration to litigation.216 
Comparing the cost differential between bilateral and class arbitration 
from the plaintiff’s point of view makes clear that the change would 
similarly be fundamental.217  If the plaintiffs were permitted to proceed as a 
class, they would be able to spread out the costs of experts and attorneys to 
make proving their claim more manageable.218  If they were forced to each 
initiate individual actions in arbitration, those costs could not be spread out, 
and the result is that no plaintiff will bring a claim at all.219  Thus, 
examining the issue of prohibitive costs the way the Court framed the 
analysis in Concepcion again leads to the conclusion that the merchants in 
Italian Colors would face prohibitive costs if compelled to resolve their 
                                                          
 213. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) 
(comparing bilateral and class arbitration to conclude that the changes between the two 
are fundamental).  But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18-19 
(comparing the cost differential between litigation and arbitration to argue that 
prohibitive costs must be those that are strictly unique to arbitration). 
 214. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51 (holding that because class arbitration 
would sacrifice the principle advantages of arbitration and increase costs to the 
defendants, the Discover Bank rule unduly interfered with the FAA). 
 215. See id. at 1751-52 (finding that greater procedures, particularly those 
procedures involved in class actions, would be too complex and high-risk for 
arbitration in the absence of multilayered review). 
 216. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 18-9 (comparing the cost 
differential between litigation and arbitration to argue that prohibitive costs must be 
those that are strictly unique to arbitration). 
 217. See Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, supra note 201, at 14 (noting that the 
merchants could spread the expert and attorney’s fees amongst other merchants in 
litigation but do not get that luxury in arbitration). 
 218. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 209-210 (2d Cir.) (citing the arbitration 
clause of American Express’s Merchant Agreement, which only precludes aggregation 
of claims if the parties elect to use arbitration), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d 
Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 
(2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 219. See id. at 219 (concluding that the class action waiver is a de facto waiver of 
liability for the defendants because it makes individual arbitration so expensive that no 
merchant will bring a claim). 
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dispute in arbitration.220  In sum, no matter how the inquiry is framed or 
what costs are considered, the plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that 
prohibitive costs would inhibit their ability to vindicate their federal 
statutory rights in arbitration, and the agreement cannot be enforced.221 
C. Concepcion Does Not Directly Apply to Italian Colors Because the 
Vindication of Rights Doctrine Arose Out of Federal Law and Did Not 
Suffer From the Same Pitfalls as the Discover Bank Rule. 
The Second Circuit and the dissent interpreted Concepcion’s holding 
strictly as an application of obstacle preemption, but the majority 
interpreted Concepcion more broadly to prohibit any attempts to evade 
binding arbitration, even if the plaintiff could not vindicate her federal 
statutory rights.222  Even if the rule arising out of Italian Colors was 
synonymous with the Discover Bank rule preempted in Concepcion, which 
it is not, the dissent correctly pointed out that the Concepcion Court did not 
address the effect its holding would have on a federal statutory right.223  
The Court was silent on its earlier holdings relating to the effective 
vindication of federal statutory rights in Mitsubishi Motors and Green 
Tree.224  The Court did not mention these cases because Concepcion simply 
found a state law was preempted as an obstacle to a federal objective, and 
the Concepcions did not establish they could not adequately vindicate their 
rights.225 
Moreover, the Court erroneously conflated Concepcion’s preemption 
                                                          
 220. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1751 (indicating that the switch from bilateral to 
class arbitration was the appropriate inquiry for determining whether a judge-made rule 
impinged on the FAA); Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 215-16 (recognizing that class 
arbitration may be the only effective mechanism for vindicating the merchants’ rights 
in this particular case). 
 221. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 212 (finding valid grounds existed for 
revoking the class action waiver under the FAA because the plaintiffs demonstrated 
arbitration was prohibitively expensive). 
 222. See, e.g., Ranier v. Citigroup, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(suggesting Conception could be interpreted to permit courts to uphold arbitration 
agreements even if the practical effect of enforcement was to leave plaintiffs without an 
adequate forum to vindicate their rights under state law). 
 223. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011) 
(holding that Congress did not intend, by enacting the savings clause of the FAA, to 
uphold state laws that contravene the FAA’s objectives). 
 224. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 216 (reasoning that the vindication of rights 
doctrine was preserved after Concepcion because the Court did not mention either 
Mitsubishi Motors or Green Tree). 
 225. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (finding that “[s]tates cannot require a 
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated 
reasons”). 
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analysis with the harmonization of two federal statutes.226  When a state 
law is in conflict with a federal law, the federal law prevails.227  That is not 
the case when two federal laws are in conflict.228  The FAA should not 
override the federal antitrust laws because class arbitration requires more 
procedure than bilateral arbitration.229  Thus, Concepcion should not have 
been read more broadly to encompass the challenge brought by the 
merchants in Italian Colors.230  Still, even under a broad reading of 
Concepcion, because the facts surrounding and including the arbitration 
agreement are sufficiently different, the Court should not have concluded 
that Concepcion controlled whether this particular arbitration agreement 
was enforceable under the FAA.231 
1. The Dissent Was Correct That Italian Colors Is Distinguishable From 
Concepcion Because the Vindication of Rights Doctrine Does Not Pose the 
Same Preemption Concerns, Nor Was the Doctrine Contemplated By 
Concepcion. 
The dissent was correct that Concepcion was not relevant to the 
disposition of this case.232  First, Concepcion disposed of the Discover 
Bank rule on preemption grounds, because the state law acted as an 
obstacle to the objective of a federal law.233  Here, the Court was charged 
                                                          
 226. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013) 
(opining that Concepcion “all but resolves this case” because Concepcion prohibits a 
court from imposing procedural barriers to arbitration or requiring the availability of 
class proceedings). 
 227. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (stating that 
federal law can preempt state law when the state law is an obstacle to the 
accomplishment of federal objectives). 
 228. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., 145 F.3d 850, 861-62 (7th Cir. 1998) 
(noting that preemption analysis is inapplicable when two federal statutes are in 
conflict). 
 229. See Ranier v. Citigroup, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 294, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(reasoning that even a broad reading of Concepcion would not warrant a finding that 
the analysis articulated in Italian Colors was invalid). 
 230. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d at 140 (Pooler, J., concurring) 
(finding the Concepcion Court’s failure to mention the line of cases establishing the 
vindication of rights doctrine an indication that those holdings were still good law). 
 231. See id. (noting a critical distinction between Italian Colors III and Concepcion 
in the fee-shifting provisions that could make the plaintiffs whole in Concepcion but 
not Italian Colors III). 
   232.  See American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2320 
(2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (asserting that Concepcion is irrelevant to this case 
because Concepcion concerned a state law that barred class action waivers even when 
class proceedings were unnecessary to sufficiently vindicate a claimant’s rights). 
   233.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion. 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1747-48 (2011) 
(concluding that the Discover Bank rule interfered with the FAA’s mandate to favor the 
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with reconciling two conflicting federal interests.234  Because Concepcion 
was not charged with making that reconciliation, the Court had to give the 
vindication of rights doctrine independent consideration on that basis 
alone.235  Second, the Concepcions sought to invalidate an arbitration 
agreement because it did not contain a class action waiver, regardless of 
whether a class action was necessary for the Concepcions to resolve the 
dispute.236  The merchants in Italian Colors, on the other hand, sought to 
invalidate an arbitration agreement because the cumulative effect of all of 
the provisions in the arbitration agreement foreclosed the merchants’ ability 
to bring their antitrust claims.237  As the dissent correctly pointed out, the 
Court’s view that the merchants’ claim rested solely on the availability of 
class actions is the sole connection between Concepcion and Italian 
Colors.238  Moreover, Concepcion did not answer the crux of the question 
in this case:  whether an arbitration agreement is unenforceable if the 
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the terms of the agreement effectively 
prevent them from bringing a claim.239  Contrary to the Court’s assertion, 
Concepcion did not address this question because the Court concluded that 
the Concepcions could effectively vindicate their rights under the terms of 
                                                          
enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their terms by continually 
invalidating arbitration agreements with class action waivers). 
   234.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (opining that 
Italian Colors is distinguishable from Concepcion because standard preemption 
analysis is inapplicable to a potential conflict between two federal statutes); Italian 
Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 2012) (asserting that Concepcion was inapposite 
because the vindication of rights doctrine is rooted in federal law of arbitrability), 
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
   235.  See Italian Colors, 133 U.S. at 2320 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
because Concepcion was not charged with harmonizing any tension between two 
federal statutes, the vindication of rights doctrine was not implicated by the decision). 
   236.  See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753 (emphasizing that the Concepcions did not 
need the benefit of class proceedings in order to be made whole). 
   237.  See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2318 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
case at hand could not solely be concerned with class action waivers because the 
agreement needs to be viewed as a whole to determine if it indeed does not provide any 
avenue for effective vindication). 
   238.  See id. (positing that the viability of Concepcion in the majority opinion rested 
solely in the “false premise” that the merchants were only challenging American 
Express’s use of the class action waiver). 
   239.  See id. (noting that the vindication of rights doctrine was not discussed in 
Concepcion because the Court was not faced with an issue in which the parties at hand 
could not effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration); Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 
1753 (holding that the Discover Bank rule was an impermissible obstacle to the FAA 
because it invalidated class actions even where unnecessary for the particular claim to 
be resolved). 
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the arbitration agreement.240  As such, Concepcion does not “all but 
resolve[ ] this case.”241 
2.  Unlike the Discover Bank Rule, the Vindication of Rights Doctrine 
Applied a Case-by-Case Test and Thus Would Not Have a 
Disproportionate Impact on Arbitration Agreements. 
Although the Discover Bank rule on its face applied to all contracts 
equally, the effect of the rule would be to displace arbitration 
agreements.242  The test envisioned by the California Supreme Court 
purported to provide for a case-by-case analysis, but was so broad that it 
was, in effect, a categorical rule that made class action waivers per se 
unenforceable.243  The Discover Bank rule intended only to cover consumer 
contracts of adhesion, but the Court found that failed to limit the rule’s 
scope.244  Also, the rule failed to describe what constitutes small damages 
or how verifiable a claim of unfair practices must be by the time the 
defendant moves to compel arbitration.245  The result would allow most 
consumers in California to bring a claim under the Discover Bank rule and 
avoid arbitration even though they could effectively vindicate their rights 
through bilateral arbitration.246 
The Second Circuit’s reasoning in Italian Colors did, however, provide 
the limiting principle that was missing in Discover Bank.247  Rather than 
                                                          
   240.  See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
    241. See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312 (asserting that because Concepcion 
invalidated previous attempts to interfere with the “primary attributes” of arbitration, 
Concepcion “all but resolves this case”). 
 242. See AT&T Moility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1750-51 (2011) 
(concluding that the rule, though on its face applied to all contracts equally, would have 
a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements, and thus fell outside of section 2 
of the FAA). 
 243. See id. at 1750-51 (holding that the Discover Bank rule would effectively 
manufacture class arbitration rather than allow parties to arbitrate according to the 
terms of their agreement). 
 244. See id. at 1750 (finding that it would be rare today to come across a consumer 
contract that was not an adhesion contract and most such contracts include arbitration 
clauses). 
 245. See id. (noting the second and third prongs of the Discover Bank rule are so 
“toothless and malleable” that they have no limiting effect and any consumer could 
demand class arbitration). 
 246. See id. at 1753 (recognizing that AT&T’s arbitration agreement was so 
consumer-friendly that the Concepcions would not only have been made whole, but 
would have been better off in arbitration). 
 247. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 212-14 (2d Cir.) (indicating Discover 
Bank employed a blanket prohibition on class action waivers, whereas the merchants 
sought revocation of the arbitration agreement in their particular instance), reh’g  en 
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creating a test that purports to apply to all contracts but in fact disfavors 
arbitration, the Second Circuit’s vindication of rights analysis required a 
detailed inquiry into the specifics of each plaintiff’s case, what costs are 
necessary to make that case, and whether those costs are prohibitive.248  
The vindication of rights doctrine as applied by the Second Circuit and the 
dissent would not have opened the floodgates for anyone who signed a 
class action waiver to avoid arbitration, as feared by the Court in 
Concepcion.249  The Second Circuit and the dissent both emphasized that 
most plaintiffs who have brought a prohibitive costs defense in the past 
have failed because of the high bar set by Green Tree to prove prohibitive 
costs.250  Thus, the rule would not tend to disfavor arbitration or have a 
disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements; it would only affect the 
plaintiffs who could provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate they 
actually could not vindicate their rights.251 
3. In Italian Colors, the Merchants Could Not Be Made Whole Through 
Bilateral Arbitration Because the Arbitration Agreement Did Not Have 
Similar Customer-Friendly Provisions. 
In Concepcion, the arbitration agreement drafted by AT&T had a 
number of consumer-friendly provisions that made even bilateral 
arbitration an attractive alternative to litigation.252  Notably, the parties 
stipulated that AT&T would pay all costs for non-frivolous claims and 
would pay a seven thousand five hundred dollar premium if the arbitrator 
gives an award greater than AT&T’s last settlement offer.253  The district 
                                                          
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 248. See id. at 218 (emphasizing that the weight of the evidence plaintiffs offered to 
prove their prohibitive costs defense in finding the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable). 
 249. See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 681 F.3d 139, 142 (2d Cir.) (Pooler, J., 
concurring) (noting that the decision will not permit every future plaintiff to establish a 
“vindication of rights” defense by hiring expensive attorneys and artfully choosing 
experts), denying reh’g en banc to Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 250. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217 (citing cases in the Fourth and Third 
Circuits in which plaintiffs failed to prove prohibitive costs; considering that failure a 
lack of sufficient evidence and thus an unviable legal theory). 
 251. See id. (finding that the burden of proof on a plaintiff to demonstrate the 
existence of prohibitive costs is high, and that courts will be able to decide when a 
record is sufficient). 
 252. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (noting 
AT&T’s arbitration agreement made it easy for consumers to go through the arbitration 
process and involved few procedures). 
 253. See id. (noting AT&T additionally agreed it could not seek reimbursement of 
its attorney’s fees and stipulated that the arbitrator could award any form of individual 
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court and the Ninth Circuit both found that use of arbitration was likely to 
make the plaintiff whole even if the case never reached arbitration or 
litigation and could potentially provide excess payment.254  Additionally, 
the district court found that consumers who were members of a class would 
likely be worse off than a consumer who arbitrated on an individual 
basis.255  Thus, the Court did not consider the effect prohibitive costs might 
have on a litigant’s ability to pursue a claim because there were no 
prohibitive costs.256  In fact, the Concepcions’ fiscal ability to pursue a 
claim in arbitration without aggregating their claims was one of the 
linchpins in the Court’s reasoning.257 
In Italian Colors, American Express provided no such incentives.258  
Instead, it mandated that all merchants that wanted to resolve a dispute pay 
all of the up-front costs and bear the full risk of losing.259  In contrast to the 
district court’s finding that the Concepcions could be made whole or even 
be better off in bilateral arbitration, the merchants in Italian Colors 
                                                          
relief). 
 254. See id. at 1752 (concluding that, as is the case with class action litigation, class 
action arbitration will force defendants to settle unmeritorious claims). 
 255. See id. at 1753 (finding consumers who proceeded as a class would be worse 
off because of the time value of money and the opportunity to only receive “a small 
percentage of a few dollars”). 
 256. See id. (stating the Concepcions were given sufficient incentives to arbitrate 
their disputes in bilateral arbitration). 
 257. See id. at 1753 (noting the Ninth Circuit’s concession that aggrieved customers 
who filed complaints with AT&T would be essentially guaranteed to be made whole 
and would be better off engaging in bilateral arbitration than proceeding as a class).  
The Concepcion Court assumed that the Concepcions did not need the benefit of the 
class action mechanism to resolve their dispute because of AT&T’s consumer-friendly 
provisions.  See id.  While it is true that those provisions made it more likely the 
Concepcions would bring a claim than the merchants in Italian Colors, those 
provisions still may not have provided an adequate incentive to bring a claim.  Whether 
or not a party has adequate incentive to bring a claim, however, is not the wrong that 
the vindication of rights doctrine attempts to remedy.  See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 
673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (finding the arbitration agreement enforceable 
when the inquiry was whether the plaintiffs had sufficient incentive to bring a claim, 
not whether the plaintiffs had the ability to effectively vindicate their rights). 
 258. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir.) (finding the terms of 
American Express’s arbitration agreement to amount to a waiver of liability), reh’g en 
banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian 
Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012). 
 259. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 2304 (2013) (Kagan, J., 
dissenting) (noting that American Express’s arbitration agreement, in addition to the 
class action waiver, included a prohibition on joinder or consolidation, precluded any 
cost-shifting, and imposed a confidentiality provision that foreclosed the possibility 
that merchants could agree to share an expert report). 
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provided persuasive evidence that they would not even come close.260 
On its face, the fee-shifting provisions provided by the Clayton Act 
appear to have the same effect as AT&T’s agreement to assume all of the 
claimants’ costs.261  However, a closer look demonstrates that the cost 
shifting that the Clayton Act provides would not make the plaintiffs 
whole.262  First, the Clayton Act does not have a fee-shifting provision for 
expert fees, which account for the majority of the merchants’ prohibitive 
costs.263  Second, the Clayton Act’s provision for the shifting of reasonable 
attorney’s fees and costs will not fully account for the merchants’ 
expenses.264  Attorney’s fees are typically not awarded in excess of the 
value of the underlying claim, which is miniscule in this case compared to 
what the fees will ultimately be.265  Consequently, because most attorneys 
counsel plaintiffs on a contingency-fee basis, no competent attorney would 
take on such a complex antitrust case when she could only hope to recover 
a small percentage of what her representation is worth.266  As a result, the 
very costs that the merchants asserted were prohibitive could not be 
recouped in arbitration even if they won their case.267 
                                                          
 260. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217-19 (relying on an expert economist’s 
affidavit to find that the merchants could not feasibly pursue their antitrust claims on an 
individual basis in arbitration). 
 261. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006) (providing an award of the cost of the suit, 
including a reasonable attorney’s fee, for successful private party plaintiffs in an 
antitrust suit). 
 262. See Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiff-Appellants at 6, Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co., 
554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 06-1871-cv) (presuming the district court interpreted 
the Clayton Act provision to mean successful plaintiffs could recoup all of their costs). 
 263. See Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987) 
(noting that the Clayton Act prohibits courts to award expert fees in excess of thirty 
dollars). 
 264. See Brief for Trial Lawyers for Public Justice, supra note 262, at 10 (finding 
the merchant plaintiffs would not be able to obtain representation unless they paid out 
of their own pockets because the Clayton Act fee-shifting provisions are inadequate). 
 265. See id. at 7-8 (noting that attorney’s fees are never awarded in excess of the 
underlying claim which, in this case, would cause a law firm to lose money because 
damages are so minimal). 
 266. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 58-59 (1st Cir. 2006) (noting the 
large initial outlay in time and money for a plaintiff’s attorney in antitrust suits and the 
uncertainty of success, which makes these claims unattractive for attorneys). 
 267. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding the 
plaintiffs could not effectively vindicate their rights in arbitration because expert and 
attorney’s fees would be prohibitively expensive), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 
(2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 
594 (2012), overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
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4. The Dicta in Concepcion Regarding Prohibitive Costs Does Not Apply to 
Italian Colors Because It Was Outside the Context of the Vindication of 
Rights Doctrine. 
The Concepcion Court did briefly mention the possibility that small 
dollar claims could keep a litigant from bringing a claim, but because those 
plaintiffs had a sufficient financial incentive to arbitrate, the Court did not 
strongly consider the question.268  The possibility that prohibitive costs 
could keep a litigant out of court, then, is still a viable avenue for plaintiffs 
who meet their burden of production to avoid arbitration under Section 
Two of the FAA.269  Not only is it still good law, but it is necessary in 
situations like the one presented here.270  Because the vindication of rights 
doctrine would not disfavor arbitration, there are no incentives to arbitrate, 
and the merchants could not recoup their costs.  It would be inequitable and 
contrary to established precedent to enforce the arbitration agreement.271 
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
A. Without the Rule Adopted By the Second Circuit in Italian Colors, the 
Class Action Mechanism Will Be Largely Unavailable for the Small-Dollar 
Claims It Was Created to Protect, and Will Allow Businesses to Avoid 
Culpability for Violating Consumers’ Rights. 
As the Supreme Court has continued to favor arbitration over litigation 
and has endorsed the use of broad arbitration clauses, businesses have been 
able to insert onerous arbitration agreements in an array of contracts.272  
This is so even when the parties, such as the merchants in Italian Colors, 
are considered sophisticated because they still may have little or no 
bargaining power.273  The Court in Concepcion correctly pointed out that 
                                                          
 268. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011) 
(considering the dissent’s argument that class action waivers were necessary for small 
dollar claims that could slip through the legal system “desirable for unrelated reasons”). 
 269. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d at 217 (finding that the lack of plaintiffs’ 
success in proving prohibitive costs under the vindication of rights doctrine went to 
“the quality of the evidence presented, not the viability of the legal theory”). 
 270. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1760 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (highlighting the 
benefits of class proceedings in situations where small-dollar claimants would more 
likely decide not to bring suit in any forum on an individual basis). 
 271. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
637 (1985) (concluding that as long as a potential litigant may effectively vindicate its 
statutory claim in arbitration, the statute continues to serve its function). 
 272. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) 
(holding arbitration clauses in employment contracts were consistent with the FAA). 
 273. See Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in Contracts of Adhesion Trap 
“Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 249-50 (2010) (finding that the 
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the days when consumer contracts were not contracts of adhesion are a 
thing of the past.274  After Concepcion, the widespread use of broad 
arbitration clauses will be even more pervasive because the Court has 
essentially shown businesses how to craft an agreement that will shield 
them from liability.275  This means that most adhesion contracts—from 
employment contracts, to cell phone contracts, to those entered into by the 
merchants and American Express—will either expressly or implicitly 
proscribe class actions and will almost always be upheld.276  At least as to 
state law claims, plaintiffs will no longer attempt to bring small-dollar 
claims because it is not economically viable when the expense would dwarf 
any potential recovery.277  As a result, businesses may implement the exact 
scheme the Discover Bank rule attempted to proscribe by explicitly or 
implicitly embedding a class action waiver into its standard form 
contract.278  Though Concepcion stated the Discover Bank rule was 
preempted because it was overbroad, in light of the Court’s apparent 
distaste for class arbitration it would likely come to a similar conclusion 
                                                          
Court has taken a hands-off approach to arbitration agreements and that unequal 
bargaining power is not a sufficient reason to hold an agreement unenforceable). 
 274. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (reasoning that the Discover Bank’s 
requirement of adhesion contract failed to limit the rule’s scope because most consumer 
contracts are adhesive (citing Carbajal v. H & R Block Tax Servs., Inc., 372 F.3d 903, 
906 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 275. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in 
the Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 627 (2012) 
(noting that most arbitration agreements after Concepcion will be upheld because of the 
sweeping holding); Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-
Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005) (noting 
that the class action mechanism is necessary to incentivize businesses to avoid the 
misconduct that leads to such consequential liability). 
 276. See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1774-76 
(2010) (holding that courts cannot compel parties to submit to class arbitration if the 
arbitration agreement does not expressly permit it); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31-32 (1991) (finding that claims arising out of employment 
contracts are arbitrable because arbitration is not inherently inconsistent with federal 
employment statutes). 
 277. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (holding that state laws that tend to disfavor 
arbitration are preempted by the FAA); see also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 
F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that when a plaintiff’s expected damages are 
infinitesimal compared to potential costs and no claims can be aggregated, no plaintiff 
will bring a claim). 
 278. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1746 (describing the Discover Bank rule that 
attempted to catch businesses engaging in the kind of fraudulent behavior complained 
of by the Concepcions); Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774-76 (finding that an arbitration 
agreement that did not mention the availability of class proceedings implicitly 
prohibited it). 
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under a case-by-case test because the FAA would still preempt state law.279  
As a result, small-dollar state law claims across the board would go largely 
unresolved, and businesses would not be held accountable for the sorts of 
violations that typically give rise to class actions.280 
Now that the Court has rejected the vindication of rights doctrine, the 
class action mechanism may be largely unavailable in both state and federal 
courts.281 As a result, only the most affluent and dedicated of consumers 
would be able to bring private actions, and those who are not as fortunate 
would be out of luck.282  This is arguably a far broader holding than what 
Concepcion states; Concepcion merely proscribed an overbroad definition 
of what is unconscionable when the instant parties actually could vindicate 
their rights in bilateral arbitration.283  The Court’s conclusion that the 
vindication of rights doctrine conflicts with the FAA has essentially ruled 
out unconscionability as a defense that falls under the savings clause, 
which the majority expressly chose not to do in Concepcion.284  Further, by 
incorporating the savings clause, Congress clearly intended for some 
arbitration agreements to still be unenforceable.285  The FAA was not 
meant to bar claims that otherwise could not go forward without class 
actions; it only intended to provide a more efficient choice of forum.286 
                                                          
 279. See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class 
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM & MARY L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2000) 
(noting the recent Supreme Court has indicated a strong preference for mandatory 
arbitration and set precedent to ensure that arbitration clauses will be enforced in most 
situations). 
 280. See, e.g., Acorn v. Household Int’l, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1169 (N.D. Cal. 
2002) (noting that plaintiffs must be able to vindicate their rights to give businesses the 
incentive to avoid conduct that leads to class actions in the first place). 
 281. See David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
IND. L.J. 239, 239 (2012) (positing that the Court has effectively rendered arbitration 
clauses per se enforceable, so defendants can use class action waivers in arbitration 
agreements to immunize themselves from facing liability). 
 282. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974) (recognizing that 
when damages are inconsequential, proceeding as a class is the only realistic option for 
resolving those disputes). 
 283. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750 (overturning Discover Bank because the 
rule it espoused was not sufficiently limited to prevent any party to a consumer contract 
from demanding class arbitration ex post). 
 284. See id. at 1753-55 (Thomas, J., concurring) (writing separately to suggest that 
the only applicable defenses under the savings clause were those relating to the making 
of an agreement, such as fraud or duress, and unconscionability was an invalid 
defense). 
 285. See Doctor’s Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (recognizing 
that the FAA savings clause permits courts to invalidate arbitration agreements for 
traditional contract defenses such as unconscionability). 
 286. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1759 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (positing how 
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In order to ensure that the class action mechanism is not eviscerated, 
Congress should consider amending the FAA to make explicit that 
arbitration agreements would be unenforceable if their provisions would 
preclude plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their rights in arbitration.287  
Then, it would be clear when enforcing an arbitration agreement would 
compromise a federal statute because the FAA itself would be 
compromised.288 
V. CONCLUSION 
Because the Second Circuit’s holding in Italian Colors is entirely 
consistent with prior Supreme Court precedent, its holding should not have 
been disturbed by the Supreme Court.289  Under Section Two of the FAA, 
the Court should have found that an arbitration agreement is unenforceable 
when the plaintiffs provide persuasive evidence that arbitration does not 
provide an adequate forum for vindicating their federal statutory rights.290  
Arbitration is an inadequate forum for vindicating statutory rights when the 
cost of admission, including necessary expert fees, is so prohibitively 
expensive that a plaintiff will be precluded from bringing a claim.291  As a 
result of the Court’s ruling, we can no longer ensure that arbitration 
agreements are only enforced when arbitration provides a change in forum 
and does not require plaintiffs to forgo substantive rights, as envisioned by 
the FAA.292 
                                                          
arbitration would actually be carried out in practice had not been fully fleshed out when 
the FAA became law, and the legislative history suggests it would primarily be sought 
to resolve disputes of fact, not law). 
 287. See Gilles & Friedman, supra note 275, at 652 (noting an attempt in Congress 
to provide that class action waivers are unenforceable in standard-form consumer and 
employment contracts). 
 288. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
627-37 (1985) (finding that the applicable federal statute is not served if the terms of an 
arbitration agreement effectively preclude the prospective litigants from vindicating 
their federal statutory rights). 
 289. See Italian Colors III, 667 F.3d 204, 214 (2d Cir.) (utilizing the vindication of 
rights doctrine because it is consistent with Green Tree and Mitsubishi Motors, which 
have not been overruled by the Court), reh’g en banc denied, 681 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.), 
cert. granted sub nom. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012), 
overruled by 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 290. See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) (holding that 
prohibitive costs can preclude a plaintiff from effectively vindicating statutory rights). 
 291. See Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (finding that any form of prohibitive costs is relevant to determine whether a 
plaintiff can vindicate her rights, not just those unique to arbitration). 
 292. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 
628 (1985) (noting that the non-drafter of an arbitration clause does not waive her 
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federal statutory rights simply by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, as long as 
arbitration merely represents a change in forum). 
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